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JPRS L/9803

22 June 1981

# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 5/81)



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PARTY AND STATE

LIBERATION OF THOUGHT, FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES DEFINED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 pp 1-2

[Article by Liu Quankai [0491 0356 7030]: "Uphold the Four Basic Principles and Continue To Liberate Thinking"]

[Text] In the new year, the most important tasks facing the people of this country are, in economics, to further readjust the national economy, and in politics, to continue to develop the situation of stability and unity. These are in the basic interest of all people of the country and are the common desire of all. And in both the smooth accomplishment of the economic readjustment tasks and in development of the political situation of stability and unity, thought should be liberated further under the leadership of the policy set forth by the Third Plenum.

Liberating thought is not a temporary measure of the party's but rather a long-term policy. We have passed through a long period of semifeudal, semicolonial society and have extensive and profound ideological influences deriving from the feudalists and bourgeoisie; the 10 catastrophic years of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" created modern superstition and used new obscurantism to shackle the masses' thinking. To liberate thought we must smash the spiritual fetters of modern superstition and break out of the ideological influences of the exploiting classes let over from the old society; we must cause the masses to throw off the fetters of modern superstition, and make a decisive break with the exploiting classes' ideology of harming others to help oneself, and with old, traditional habits. This is assuredly not something that can be accomplished in a short time. The belief that liberating thought has already run its course or has been overdone is incorrect. But liberating thought should be beneficial to the four modernizations, to stability and unity, and to the centralization and unification of the whole party and the whole army. Liberating thought should be predicated on upholding the four basic principles to be portrayed as opposites or allow people to break with the four basic principles while prattling on about liberating thought. This state of affairs truly exists in some cases, and attention should be called to it.

Is It Liberation of Thought To "Say What Has Never Been Said Before"?

Modern superstition has brought forth the bitter fruit of ideological ossification and has completely fettered some people's minds. They cannot consider a problem, but can only follow the book and copy the leaders' directives, imitating them all whether they are right or wrong. In their work they act as "megaphones" or "clear-

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ing houses" and have no ideas, views or voice of their own, to say nothing of creativity. Accordingly, a basic requirement for liberating thought is that of setting the machinery in motion and considering problems. To start, thinking should be enlivened, old theories should be discarded and new ideas created, and new viewpoints boldly brought forth.

However, is merely offering new viewpoints and saying what has never been said before liberation of thought? It would be extremely one-sided to think so.

People's thinking reflects objective reality, and the correctness of what they say depends on whether it is in accordance with objective reality. Whether a new viewpoint is worth advocating or an old viewpoint is worth discarding should be determined in accordance with this standard; it is not true that only the new is worthwhile and that only "new" viewpoints, never before been advocated, are correct. The theory of surplus value, the dialectical-materialist principle that matter determines consciousness and consciousness reflects matter and the theory that capitalism will inevitably be replaced by socialism were all put forward by Marx more than a hundred years ago; and some people believe that they should all be considered "outmoded ideas." But the older they are, the newer they become: The longer they have existed, the more they have been proven to be true, and they cannot be rejected. In contrast, many fallacies from the period of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" have been labeled "new" and touted as "new developments" in Marxism; but the under the banner of breaking new ground, they actually consist of old, stale goods. In ancient times this country had a saying that "externally their words are ever new and changing, but if you examine their true nature, they are increasingly mean and degenerate." Accordingly all new viewpoints must be analyzed to see whether they are in accordance with reality and are well-reasoned. If we approve of everything "new" no matter what its content, it is very easy to be deceived.

Marxism is not a dogma but a science. Marxism does not exhaust all truth, but must continue to develop, and the development of Marxism is not based solely on what some individuals can do, but requires everyone's common efforts. To liberate thinking we need to replace certain individual outmoded principles of Marxism with new principles which generalize actual experience. Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist who brought the universal principles of Marxism and the specific practice of China's revolution into agreement and developed Marxism. But Comrade Mao Zedong also made errors, and these errors, particularly some theories and formulations which have been shown by experience to be erroneous, should under certain circumstances be discussed and investigated. If we go by the "two all's" and they must always be followed without alteration, we merely stifle thought and choke off the party's vitality. But these discussions and investigations must be conducted in a spirit of finding the truth and with a rigorous and conscientious attitude. All of the relevant material must be collected and thoroughly analyzed and investigated, without demagoguery but with the intention of finding the truth of the matter. Influencing factors and objectives effects must be taken into account. Many comrades have proceeded in this way, according great importance to study and making assiduous investigations, while refraining from unfounded statements and from glib pronouncements on subjects they do not understand. But there are also a few people, particularly some young people, who have neither investigated the history of our country's revolution nor come to an all-round understanding of the country's current conditions, and who know even less of Marxism and have assimilated it imperfectly. On

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the basis of hearsay they pronounce all manner of ill-considered opinions on matters they do not understand, deny certain basic truths and attitudes of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, and style themselves as "liberators of thinking," treating anyone who does not agree with them as "old-fashioned," "conservative," or "ossified." This is a problem of thought and understanding: They lack the spirit of seeking truth and they consider novel, high-flown theories to be liberation of thought. In addition there is an extremely small number of people who, under the banner of liberating thought, advocate such outlandish ideas as that "China has a bureaucratic class" and "Marxism is an illusion without scientific foundations." Such outlandish ideas as these are in reality old stuff which the bourgeoisie has long touted and which we encountered long ago. Lenin said, "Distorting the meaning of words has long been an extremely common phenomenon in politics," and "the term 'revolution' lends itself readily to misuse, and when a movement has developed to a certain stage it is even unavoidable that people should misuse it" ("Selected Writings of Lenin," Vol 1, p 615). This was exactly the case during the 10 catastrophic years. Is it not true that many reprehensible things were done under the fair name of revolution? Now the slogan "Liberate Thought" is facing a similar fate at the hands of some people. We must heighten our vigilance against such people who under the guise of "liberating thought" are peddling the bourgeoisie's wares.

The Assertion That "The Thinking of Officialdom Is Not Liberated, But the People's Thinking Is Liberated" Is Sheer Nonsense

In relation to the liberation of thought some people have fabricated the theory of "officialdom and the people," contending that all leadership cadres represent "officialdom" with vested interests, so that their thinking is not liberated. It is only those without power, representing the so-called "people," who can liberate thought. They say that the truth can only be with the "people" and not with "officialdom." This view wantonly transfers the relationship between officials and people in an exploiting society to a socialist society, and is a complete fallacy.

Officials of all ranks in the exploiting classes' society are the "masters" whose prestige and well-being are set on the people's shoulders, who use their power to cruelly oppress the common people and suck their lifeblood, so that the officials and the people are in fundamental opposition. In the exploiting classes' society, there were certain individual good officials such as Bao Zheng and Hai Rui who administered the law fairly, behaved incorruptably, and were able to do good for the people to some degree. But because the exploiting classes' state machinery was a tool for enslaving and oppressing the people, the existence of a tiny minority of honest officials could not change the essential situation of an opposition between officials and people. The proletariat's leadership cadres, however, are different: They are leaders, an element of the people, and the people's "public servants," and the relationship between cadres and masses, i.e. between officials and people, contains no fundamental opposition.

During the 10 catastrophic years, it actually came to pass that the party's excellent work style was destroyed and some leadership cadres were infected with the attitudes of the oppressing classes' officials, became exalted, divorced from the masses and from reality, and some dealt in prerogatives and special privileges. But this was because they were tarnished by the ideology of the exploiting class so that their proletarian party spirit was weakened or lost, and it was not because

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they represented "officialdom." In a situation where there still existed remnants of the feudal class and influences of bourgeois thought, incorrect tendencies also existed among certain of the worker and peasant masses who were not leadership cadres at all. It was only because their positions were different that their behavior differed: In both cases the source was ideological influences of the exploiting classes. Accordingly the problems of eliminating the ideological influence of the exploiting class and rectifying incorrect tendencies and the task of destroying the fetters of modern superstition and the ideology of self-interest and liberating thought exist for both cadres and masses and for both leadership and ordinary cadres. Of course, leadership cadres at all levels should set an example in this respect. And use of the distinction between "officialdom" and "the people" as a replacement for analysis of social and class origins, as well as the belief that the masses' thought is inevitably liberated and the leaders' thought is inevitably not liberated, are approaches which are entirely at variance with Marxist class analysis and with the principles of historical materialism.

Liberating thought means bringing thought into agreement with reality, reconciling the subjective with the objective, and seeking the reality of the situation. Provided that a leadership cadre is not selfish or prejudiced, but makes assiduous investigations, takes the masses as his teacher, and brings theory into agreement with reality, he will be able to break out of all shackles and liberate his thought, and will be able to arrive at more truths. Such persons are a majority in the ranks of our cadres. But if comrades who are not in leadership posts lack the above-mentioned spirit, they will similarly be unable to liberate their thought and attain truths.

The touting of the "theory of truth in power" by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" during the 10 catastrophic years was entirely reactionary. Power and position bring people neither knowledge nor truth; truth is not the inevitable concomitant of power. But provided that one's power is not divorced from the people, but can be used to serve the people, it is no hindrance to liberating thought or to arriving at truths. In reality, once the "gang of four" was smashed, many circumstances that were in accord with objective reality and many policy decisions and measures which had deep support among the masses, such as the general policy of readjusting, reforming, rectifying and upgrading the national economy and the decision to reform the party and state leadership system and the economic system, were proposed by none other than the party Central Committee. This proves that the idea that "officialdom" is supposedly unliberated in its thinking and possesses no truths is complete nonsense. Those who claim that they stand for "the people," that their thought is liberated and that they are the possessors of truths actually possess not truth but fallacy.

Can Upholding the Four Basic Principles Hinder Liberation of Thought?

To liberate thought it is necessary to eliminate the "forbidden areas" and all "restrictions" which hinder its liberation: Does this not mean that the four basic principles should also be done away with? Some people actually think so. They believe that the assertion that liberation of thought cannot deviate from the four basic principles is "setting restrictions" and that it will hinder liberation of thought; this is an incorrect idea.

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The four basic principles, namely the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, embody the fundamental interests of all people in the country, and are a necessity of historical development. Only by upholding the four basic principles does our country and its people have a future and hope, and only in this way can the four modernizations be implemented and the people's interests be protected. Admittedly our country's social system is still imperfect and still has faults, the state system of the people's democratic dictatorship still has shortcomings, leadership by the party still needs improvement, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought were extremely distorted and falsified during the 10 catastrophic years and require restoration to their original aspect and further development. Accordingly, in connection with upholding the four basic principles we need to sum up the lessons of historical experience, exalt democracy, listen thoroughly to the masses' opinions, and permit disputes between different views. All rigorous and conscientious disputes based on investigation and study help to enliven thought and develop truths. The aim of this approach is to support the four basic principles more effectively, not to doubt or negate them.

The four basic principles are not the conception of some genius, but a reflection of the objective laws of social development, and truths repeatedly proved by long experience. To liberate thought we must destroy superstition and dogma, but we must not do away with science or truth. All new discoveries and all new viewpoints proposed during the liberation of thought should be helpful in the development of science and truth rather than the opposite. Since the four basic principles are basic truths, they not only cannot come into conflict with liberation of thought, but are entirely in accord with it. When a train moves along its track, the track is not a hindrance to it, and similarly, advocating the four basic principles cannot hinder the liberation of thought: We proceed on the correct tracks precisely in order to liberate thought. Some people treat the four basic principles as "restrictions" and are not entirely happy with them or even oppose them, saying that they should be "suspended." We should like to ask just where this kind of "liberation" of thought is intended to lead. Does "liberation of thought" consist only in smashing the four basic principles? Is the thinking of those people who consider the four basic principles to be "restrictions" and believe that they will hinder the liberation of thought entirely without restrictions itself? No indeed. If today's extremely diverse countries do not belong to one social system they belong to another; they all have different parties and different ideologies. If someone is opposed to the four basic principles he always wants to adopt some other "principles"; for example, if he does not want the socialist system, he must want a different kind of social system, and if he does not want the leadership of the Communist Party, he must want the leadership by some other party. Some people have actually advocated such ideas openly, stating that "socialism cannot be implemented either in China or anywhere in the world," or "the four modernizations can be implemented and socialism built without the leadership of the Communist Party." Is this not setting up different "restrictions"? Comrade Zhou Enlai said: "Marxism has a framework. We have a general framework, we do not oppose frameworks in general." Although the exploiting classes in our country no longer exist, classes have not been entirely destroyed, and although the class struggle has already ceased to be the main contradiction in our country, it still exists. Accordingly, in their thinking or pronouncements involving major political questions, people either consciously or unconsciously reflect the interests, viewpoints and requirements of a specific class, and their social consequences generally benefit either one class or another. In these terms, people's understanding has limits. The people who oppose the four basic principles as "restrictions" have not really cast off all "restrictions" themselves; it is just that they are employing the "restrictions" other principles.

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Liberating thought is a policy to which our party unswervingly adheres. After the "gang of four" was smashed, if we had not had a mass movement to liberate thought, but had acted according to the "two all's," we would not have been able to effect a shift of the focus of party work, to carry out the readjustment of the national economy or to implement the reform of the state leadership system and the economic system, we would have been unable to implement a number of party policies, and in a word, we would not have the four modernizations or socialism. Accordingly, the liberation of thought must continue to be developed, thoroughly and in a healthy manner, without any wavering. However, the liberation of thought does not mean that anyone can say anything he likes or do anything he pleases, can reject party leadership, socialism, centralization and discipline, and can approve of all manner of incorrect ideas. Much less can we permit a small minority to distort the slogan "Liberate Thought," to peddle all manner of contraband goods and to disseminate antiparty, antisocialist views. There should be thorough democracy among the people, the expression of different opinions should be permitted, and even if people express incorrect opinions they must not be attacked or given labels indiscriminately; those with incorrect opinions should be given guidance and education, while the necessary criticism and struggle should be used in the case of all antiparty, antisocialist opinions. A clear distinction should be made between this and attacks or labeling. We should propagandize justly and energetically the four basic principles and firmly implement them; we should continue unwaveringly to liberate thought, for in this way our country's four modernizations will assuredly be realized and socialism will assuredly be victorious.

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PARTY AND STATE

READJUSTMENT OF WORK STYLE, DISCIPLINE URGED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Jan 81 p 3

[Article reprinted from 23 Dec 80 issue of RENMIN HAIJUN: "Carry Out a Rectification of Work Style and Discipline"]

[Text] Some units have already made use of the favorable opportunity of summing up work as the year ends and the arrival of new soldiers and the return of old ones to implement education and rectification regarding work style and discipline. This work is highly necessary, and doing it well is extremely important for the completion of this year's tasks. All units should follow this example and approach the work energetically both before and after the Spring Festival.

Education and rectification with regard to work style and discipline should begin with the cadres. The cadres' behavior amounts to tacit orders. When the work of education and rectification of the cadres has been done well, they will set an example everywhere and the units will follow them.

The combination of persuasive education and bold administration has always been an effective method of rectifying work style and discipline, and we should use the same approach on this occasion. Comrades who breach discipline should be patiently persuaded, ably set straight and enlightened; they must not be coerced or stifled. Those who are coerced generally do not submit, and attempts to style them are unsuccessful. But this does not mean that we should refrain from carrying out suitable criticism and from taking necessary disciplinary measures. Criticism and disciplinary measures are also education. The lack of the courage to point out and correct bad phenomena and to come to grips with pernicious influences and set them straight must be rectified.

The focus of this education and rectification regarding work style and discipline is on actively implementing regulations and ordinances and on conscientiously implementing rules and regulations. We should continue setting up a healthy and normal system for working and living, based on regulations. Every cadre and fighter must know and conscientiously carry out his duties, maintain security, pay strict regard to appearance and bearing, conduct and discipline, stress courtesy and etiquette, observe discipline, obey the laws, protect social ethics, and set a good example at all times.

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LANZHOU UNITS CADRES STUDY DEFENSIVE WARFARE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Deng Guotian [6772 0948 3240], Wang Fuhong [3769 4395 7703] and Wang An [3769 1344]: "Integrate a Summing up of Experience With an Inquiry Into Future Warfare--The Lanzhou Units Assembled Military Cadres To Study Some Problems at the Initial Stage of a War"]

[Text] A team of military cadres in training held by the Lanzhou Units have just completed a training course recently. Did it score any significant results? The participating cadres admitted that at the very beginning of the course, they did not know much about the concept of "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of war" [7786 1017 1343 7089 1785 0155 2069]. Having finished the course, they now feel relatively at home with this concept.

After Comrade Su Yu [4725 5940] published his article entitled "An Inquiry Into the Problems Relating to the Methods of Fighting at the Initial Stage of Anti-Aggression War in the Future," the party committee of the Lanzhou Units decided to conduct a team of military cadres in training on the basis of their position and mission. The participants consisted of the key commanding officers from various armies of the Lanzhou Units; the major commanders of provincial military districts, and the leading cadres from judicial, political and rear service establishments. These comrades had fought in the Revolutionary War and acquired definite combat experience. Nevertheless, to direct combat under contemporary conditions remained for them a new topic for study. The leading cadres of the Lanzhou Units stressed time and again that the training course should integrate experience with an inquiry into future warfare. An inquiry into the problems of "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war" could serve to enhance the organizational as well as the commanding capabilities of the participating cadres on the one hand and seek the pattern of experience needed for warfare under contemporary conditions on the other. The team of military cadres in training fully manifested military democracy. On academic issues, they spoke out and expressed their opinions freely. In content and methods, they avoided technological work as much as possible. Instead, the emphasis was laid on other aspects--deliberation on substance, small group discussion, research paper writing, and roundtable discussion. Prominence was also given to discussing the theoretical aspects of "holding fast to defensive warfare" and a commander's command over his organization.

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During the training, the leading cadres of Lanzhou Units paid great attention to guiding the students in their study of the specific laws of modern warfare and probing into flexible tactics in operations suitable for contemporary conditions. On the basis of integrating their firsthand experience with discussions on the basic principles of "holding fast to defensive warfare," those comrades who had taken part in the "Shangganling Campaign" [0006 3927 5749] and the "38th Parallel Campaign" during the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea seriously studied the technical equipment of the opposite side in a future war and the main features of a group army's offensive campaign. In addition, the principles of utilizing our arms of services including the air force, artillery troops, armored troops, signal troops, antichemical corps, and political work as well as logistics safeguard were diligently studied. Furthermore, problems such as how to form a strong defense system, how to carry out counter-assault and counter-strike tactics, and how to organize the various services and arms to fight in coordination at the "initial stage of militarily holding fast to defensive warfare" were earnestly discussed. Moreover, an army commander made a thorough study of how to take effective coordinated action of "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare." The three observations presented by him were concise and to the point. First, the commanders of the combined arms unit and of the various arms must understand one another, and be familiar with the characteristics and principles of using the various arms. Second, in organizing coordination, the essentials must be firmly grasped. With respect to the various arms, it is essential to have a well-organized coordination among the infantry, tank units, artillery troops and the air force. During operations, emphasis should be laid on coordinated actions in resisting continuous assault by the enemy's infantry and tank units on the one hand and carrying out a vigorous counterattack on the other. As to wiping out targets, the main effort is to coordinate action dealing with the enemy's tank assemblage and airborne force. Finally, great attention should be paid to safeguarding communications.

In exploring the problems of organization and command with reference to "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war," they repeatedly combined the study of principles with the salient topographical features of a hypothetical battlefield. They seriously analyzed favorable as well as unfavorable conditions of standing fast at a given region's defense, and inquired into tactics suitable for its salient features. For the purpose of increasing their perception of theory, they crossed the Gobi Desert and traversed the length and breadth of the land around a hypothetical theater of operations and its adjacent area. They conducted on-the-spot investigations of the region's fortifications, topography, climate, water supply, roads and resident population. Then, they worked indoors. By integrating theory with practice in their learning process and deliberation, the students not merely grasped the theoretical aspects of "holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war," but also, in a relatively systematic manner, studied and drilled on the tactics of sticking to defending a hypothetical theater's garrison focal point. Besides, many valuable hypotheses relating to some aspects of battleground construction including the transformation of topography and roads, the integration of farmland capital construction, and the construction of antitank fortifications were advanced.

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Through study and discussion, the participating cadres have learned how to organize and command "militarily holding fast to defensive warfare at the initial stage of a war." In order to turn personal experience and what they have learned into useful knowledge shared by the troops, they completed 9 research papers, 27 working papers and revised drafts on the "Syllabus of Some Problems Concerning Theoretical Aspects of Militarily Holding Fast to Defensive Warfare" in the course of assembling for training. Their arduous works provided useful materials suited to this region for the training of junior commanding officers.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CHINA SAID TO NEED STRONG BORDER DEFENSE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Sep 79 p 1

[Commentary: "It Is Necessary To Have a Strong Border Defense"]

[Text] Fighting the war of self-defensive counterattack on the China-Vietnam border firmly convinced us: the four modernizations must be defended by armed force. Our garrison forces defending the land border and sea coast are the first line in battling to defend the four modernizations.

The realization of socialist modernization requires a peaceful international environment and stable border areas. The four modernizations are a great and heroic undertaking. It makes our enemies feel nervous and uneasy, so that they are bound to try by all possible means to wreck them and cannot let them peacefully be carried out. This poses a problem: when we concentrate our strength on constructing the four modernizations, we must maintain sharp vigilance and defend the safety of the border areas, closely integrating the construction of the four modernizations with the defense of the four modernizations. Our country's territory is vast, and the land border defense line alone is over 21,000 kilometers in length, of which close to two-thirds is contiguous to the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Vietnam. The border regions are inhabited by the minority nationalities. In our country, although the population of the minority nationalities is only about 6 percent of the total population, the regions they live in account for 50 to 60 percent of the total area of the country, a vast territory abounding in natural resources. If a war breaks out, no matter whether it is on a small, medium or large scale, the border areas and the minority nationality regions will bear the brunt. All this shows that the border defense struggle will be protracted and critical and that is a matter of urgency to strengthen border defense construction, and shows that in order to realize the four modernizations it is necessary to construct prosperous border areas and strong border defenses.

History is a mirror. Over the 30 years since the founding of the state, we have fought many wars of self-defensive counterattack in defense of the border areas, smashing the aggressive and subversive plots of big and little hegemonism and defending the motherland's peace and territorial integrity, in order to create advantageous conditions for the construction of socialism. People can just imagine: if there were not such conditions, there would be daily alarms sounded

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from the strategic positions along the border and year after year the beacon fires would not be extinguished, and in such a case could we have concentrated our energy on socialist construction?

The so-called "political border defense" advocated by Lin Biao was in reality borders without defense and even no borders and no defenses. In those years, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" time and again seriously weakened border defense construction. Although we have refuted the fallacy of "political border defense," it still today remains in the minds of some comrades as a wound that demands prompt healing.

"The border defense forces in peacetime and on sentry duty, once a war breaks out, will only be engaged in small-scale fighting." This view is incorrect. Border defense is not a small matter. The border defense garrison forces occupy the first line of struggle against enemies. The places where they are stationed are scattered and numerous, and they live under tough conditions, their tasks are onerous, and their struggle will be complex. In case war breaks out, whether we can resist the first wave of a sudden enemy attack, whether we can delay the enemy's offensive, and thus give us the time necessary for war preparations, have a direct bearing on how well we construct border defenses. In line with the demands for defending the four modernizations with armed force, we must build our border defense forces into strong forces that are Red politically and ideologically, that understand our policies to a high degree, that are well organized and disciplined, that can work with the masses, that have both definite military qualities and a mastery of the techniques of border defense fighting, and that can carry out both political and military tasks. Only this kind of forces can shoulder the heavy responsibility on the borders and insure that "a certain number of troops can defend against an uncertain number of invaders," so that our border defenses will truly pass the test of political disturbances and severe warfare.

Then there is this phenomenon: the soldiers are defending the border but their minds are elsewhere. This mental state is extremely detrimental to the building of strong border defenses. Focusing on this situation, the great number of officers and men in the border defense garrison forces pointed out: "Cherish the border areas and take root in the border areas, defend the border areas, and construct the border areas." This is what people usually speak of as the "four borders" idea. Firmly establish the idea of the "four borders" is a correct slogan. If we want to construct border defense well we cannot do without this slogan. Within the "four borders," cherishing the border areas is the premise, and the other "three borders" are established on this ideological basis. By solving the problem of cherishing the border areas through sinking deep roots there, they will be able to construct the border areas without being afraid to work up a sweat and will courageously devote themselves to the defense of the border areas.

There is yet another situation, viz, speaking of joint defense but actually practicing singlehanded defense of one's own position. If this situation is not turned around, it will be impossible to defend effectively. If we do things according to the ultraleft line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four,"



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for example, taking the Mongolian nationality's habit of drinking tea with milk as a "bourgeois lifestyle" and the Hui people's habit of demanding that no allowances be made for eating pork as a "new trend in class struggle," how can we unite the masses in the border areas for joint defense? True strength lies in the masses. With the border defense line this long, if we are separated from the support of the masses of people and only rely on the units doing things without any following, it will be hard to strengthen border defense, to truly do good mass work in the border areas, especially to do good work with the minority nationalities and the militia and to do good military-civilian joint defense. With our motherland's long land border defense line and extensive sea border, only if everybody is a sentry, every home is a sentry post and every village is a fortress can the motherland become an impregnable fortress.

The four modernizations require a strong border defense--this viewpoint is agreed by all, from top to bottom. The problem is that, once the question of land border and seacoast defense is touched upon, many strange phenomena arise: some are that "The mouth is tight but the heart slack," and there is a lot of empty talk but little done in fact; some problems, which originally were easy to solve, were pigeonholed for long periods of time so that they became a big pile: and also, with regard to certain problems that were hard to solve at one time, responsibility was mutually pushed back and forth, and no one thought of making reforms....

In the background of this kind of phenomena is a concealed problem, viz, the problem of leadership style. If we want to make progress in border defense construction within a short period of time, and cause it to take a new lead forward, there must be a fundamental transformation in leadership style. In the hearts of the leaders there must be a place for border defense, in all cases putting defense of the border first and defense of the interior next, putting the companies first and defense of the organization next. Problems that can be solved today definitely cannot be put off until tomorrow, and problems that one can solve oneself definitely cannot be pushed off onto others. If we want to truly build prosperous border areas and strong border defenses, a current problem that sticks out is: transform the leadership style!

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SQUAD LEARNS LESSON FROM DEFEAT IN SEA LANDING EXERCISE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Xu Honghua [1776 3163 5478] et al.: "Draw Lessons From 'Defeat'"]

[Text] Midsummer with the scorching sun directly overhead. On the Yellow Sea outpost of "Hill 51," the smoke of gunpowder blurs the scene and there is the sound of death-dealing guns. This is a tactical defense exercise in resisting a landing operation that was organized by a certain regiment of the Qingdao Garrison District. Gradually the gunpowder smoke dissipates and the deadly sound subsides. The 2d Squad of the 6th Company, which had been standing fast guarding the hill, because of "heavy casualties," has its position occupied by an "enemy" motorized infantry platoon.

This result, which departed from the common practice in former naval war exercises, was widely discussed by people. Some said: "In training exercises, our armed forces cannot suffer a defeat," but the comrades of the 2d Squad felt that they had learned many things from this "defeat." In the final analysis, which view is correct? Please take a look at the main course of this "battle."

The Trick of Lifting Artillery Fire

At the beginning of the "battle," a swarm of "enemy aircraft" flew in close to the sea surface. After they had bombed wantonly and indiscriminately, a fierce artillery bombardment on our position came from the sea. The fighters of the 2d Squad, holding their rifles, squatted in their shelters, prepared at any time to hit back. Several minutes passed and then the observer gave the signal: The "enemy's" bombarding fire had been lifted. The entire squad quickly jumped out of their shelters and occupied the position. Squad leader Gao Liyun [7559 4539 6663], while ordering the defense works to be repaired in a rush, had misgivings: Strange! Why was the artillery attack so brief? According to the enemy's tactical principles, this short an artillery bombardment means that the enemy's LST's are not far from the shoreline. Can it be a trick? How should I handle this situation? Prior to this, if he had envisaged a fixed plan for dealing with a situation, everything went all right. Suddenly he heard a sharp scream in the air: the "enemy's" lifted artillery fire had returned and was plunging down on top of the squad.

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"Hit the ground," shouted squad leader Gao Liyun. However, it was too late. Two comrades who were a little slow in hitting the ground were "killed" and one was wounded. After the artillery fire had lifted, the squad quickly made rush-repairs on the defense works and gave first-aid to the "wounded" soldier.

(Writer's note: The organizers of this tactical exercise set up this situation in which there was a trick in the enemy's lifting of his artillery fire, so that the 2d Squad's was caught unawares with regard to the tactical training topic of "defending against artillery"; but the exercise helped, by this negative example, the comrades of the 2d Squad to understand this truth: the enemy is extremely tricky and the situation on the battlefield is ever-changing. We certainly must envisage more complexity in peacetime training and make a point of tempering the trainees in the capability of flexibly dealing with all sorts of complex situations. Otherwise, if they simply deal with changeable situations, it will be hard for them to avoid taking losses passively.)

Under cover of artillery fire, three "enemy tanks," in a blustering and truculent manner, make a forced beach landing.

"Hill 51," defended by the 2d Squad, slopes gently and to its front is level beach. The hill is easy to attack and hard to defend and is extremely advantageous for tank assaults. According to the predetermined operational plan, which called for an ambush attack on the tanks, the squad sent three antitank teams, carrying rocket launchers, bangalore torpedoes, and satchel charges, to the prebuilt defense works below the position, where they would wait until the "enemy tanks" were blocked by the mine clusters on the beach at the high tide line, and then mercilessly attack them. However, the minefield had already been destroyed by artillery fire.

The "enemy tanks" fiercely charged through. Rocket launcher gunner Sun Jinqi [1327 6651 2978] got one tank in his sights. There was a "boom" and the tank was hit, but it forged ahead as before. The rocket projectile had not pierced the front part of its composite armor. Bangalore torpedo gunner Mu Wei'an [4476 5898 1344], holding his weapon in both hands, jumped up and rushed forward. Cleverly making use of terrain features, he crawled, rolled and suddenly jumped forward, putting to good use the tactical movements he had learned in peacetime training. But, owing to the fact that the tanks alternately covered each other and that the firepower was fierce and their vital points small, he found no way to get close to them.

The three antitank teams were pinned down in trenches and shell craters by machinegun fire from the "enemy tanks." With a mighty roar the "enemy tanks" plunged through the prebuilt antitank defense works, scattering the antitank teams behind them. At this juncture, according to the second phase of the predetermined plan, the rocket launcher team should, making use of terrain, attack the "enemy tanks" from the rear and the flanks, and the bangalore torpedo team should concentrate its fire so as to intercept the "enemy infantry" and cut off the "enemy" tanks from his infantry. But, unexpectedly, following on the heels of the "enemy tanks" were three "armored cars." Fire from machineguns and submachineguns of the armored cars was fierce. Sun Jinqi got his sights on the rear of one "enemy tank" and was about to fire when a fierce burst of machinegun fire from an "armored car" "cut him down."

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Seeing the "enemy tanks" pushing through, and being unable either to attack or withdraw, bangalore torpedo team leader Mu Qingguang [4476 1987 0342] ordered everybody to throw a volley of handgrenades and, under cover of the resulting smoke and dust, jump into a ditch and take a shortcut back to the position.

At the main position, squad leader Gao Liyun saw the next situation perfectly clearly. After conferring with the deputy squad leader, he decided to quickly lay mines to the front and right side of the position, so as to force the "enemy tanks" to go in front of a rain-swollen ditch and thus stop their advance and force the infantry out of the cars. The squad moved quickly and laid mine clusters. When the enemy tanks approached, deputy rocket launcher gunner Pei Dong [1014 2639] from the flank fired his last rocket projectile, which hit and severed the track of one "enemy tank." The rest of the tanks turned and charged toward the left flank. They had not gone far when they were blocked by the ditch and had to stop. One platoon of "enemy infantry" climbed out of the "armored cars" and, deploying into formation, charged our position.

(Writers' note: This "battle" against tanks shows the results of the 2s Squad's peacetime training in attacking tanks and also reveals problems in peacetime training. It made the fighters see that, owing to the fact that their peacetime training in studying the enemy's armed forces was insufficient, they had only drilled in how to cut the connection between the enemy's infantry and tanks and they had not thought about the connection between the enemy's tanks and armored cars. The result was that they suffered losses from the enemy armored cars following on the heels of the enemy tanks. This made the comrades of the 2d Squad a little wiser: Only by strengthening the study of the characteristics of the enemy's equipment, authorized strength, and tactics can the training lessen our blindness in action and truly train us in skills that will subdue enemy tanks.)

'Enemy' Infantry That Could Not Be Repulsed

At the position, the fighters closely observed the "enemy," waiting with leveled guns and chests stuck out. The enemy rushed toward the position en masse. But, on the assumption that the enemy was not making a feint, the fighters had beforehand carried out tactical drills for coordinating their operations, training for over 3 months in line with the enemy's authorized strength and tactical principles, so that their fighting capacity was fairly strong. They saw the "enemy" form a front-facing triangular formation and advance, making use of the cover provided by terrain features.

Squad leader Gao Liyun had made quite a peacetime study of the enemy's tactics. In a low voice he ordered the squad to disperse to their sectors and prepare to fire, waiting for the best opportunity. As expected, when an "enemy" squad rushed to a point about 20 meters in front of the position, they suddenly and simultaneously made a half leap and prepared to throw hand grenades. At the sound of Gao Liyun's "Fire," the 2d Squad opened a fierce fire. Over half the "enemy" soldiers were shot down and the rest fled in disorder.

The "enemy tanks" and "armored cars" retaliated with violent fire, especially the tank at the right of the position whose track had been cut, and owing to advantageous terrain, it posed an even greater threat to the 2d Squad. Gao Liyun

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ordered two fighters to destroy this tank. The two fighters had not moved out very far when they were suddenly ambushed by several "enemy soldiers." The fighter in front was "killed." The "enemy commanding officer," anticipating that the 2d Squad would make this move, had laid the ambush. Quick-witted Wang Guaoming [3769 0948 2494] and another fighter, taking advantage of the "enemy ambushers" being off guard, attacked them from the flank. With several handgrenades, they wiped out the ambushers and destroyed this "enemy tank."

The "enemy" redeployed his forces and launched a new offensive, intensifying his fire on the front of the position as if he planned to make a frontal breakthrough at one stroke. Gao Liyun, calmly observing the "enemy's" battle formation, discovered that they could be playing a trick. The "enemy," feigning a frontal attack as a screen, sent two squads to quickly outflank the position on the right. Gao Liyun immediately grabbed a light machinegun and with two combat teams moved to the right flank, leaving only two fighters to hold the "enemy" at the front of the position. The two "enemy" squads had just started their assault on the right flank when they were soundly beaten back.

The "enemy commanding officer," adapting himself to changed conditions, ordered the one squad that was making the screening feint attack to make it the main attack, and the squad suddenly launched a fierce assault. The result was that, owing to the fact that the 2d Squad's firepower and military strength at the front of the position had been weakened, the "enemy" broke through the position. This time the 2d Squad was thrown into confusion, and the "enemy" on the right flank took advantage of this favorable situation to charge forward. Even though the fighters had bravely killed many of the enemy, in the end, because of their own excessive "casualties," they were hopelessly outnumbered and lost the position.

(Writers' note: This battle against enemy infantry was quite brilliant, and it broke down the old conventions of past exercises being like an act in a play. The enemy is not routed with one blow and defeated in every battle. It was not determined beforehand who would win and who would lose. During this confrontation, both sides engaged in a battle of wits and bravery, the situation was complex, and the scene was true to life. In this exercise, although the 2d Squad suffered a "defeat," they were profoundly enlightened by it. The fighters said it well: Being "defeated" several more times like this will certainly spur us to continually raise our tactical and technical levels, and in a future war against aggression we can win many victories.

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BEING DEFEATED BY 'ENEMY' IN TRAINING EXERCISES IS NECESSARY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Ai Hongjun [5337 4767 6511] of a certain tank regiment: "Let Us Begin by Discussing 'How Is It Possible To Suffer a Defeat in a Military Exercise'"]

[Text] Going among the troops, I observed the tactical training of several tank companies. I discovered a common problem, viz, the conditions were simplified and there was wishful thinking about the enemy's situation. Our forces were victorious every time, winning in the first encounter, and the "enemy forces" were defeated every time, collapsing at the first encounter. This is just what is called "killing off the rebels with three blows and pacifying Shaanxi and Gansu." With this kind of imitative predisposition and setup conditions, how can we not deceive ourselves as well as others, and how can we talk about the troop training being hard, strict and geared to the needs of actual combat? However, some of our commanders take exception to this position and say: How is it possible to suffer a defeat in a military exercise? Our forces have been consistently victorious and have never been defeated. This idea, which only lays stress on the enemy's being a paper tiger and neglects his aspect as a real tiger, runs counter to military dialectics.

The ancients said: "Victory and defeat are common occurrences for military strategists." This saying is an immutable truth. In fact, there has never been an even-victorious general who has never been defeated, and in war it is impossible not to suffer setbacks. Sun Bin, a strategist of ancient China, once pointed out that before a battle one must think of the possibility of defeat so that one can then make good preparations to turn defeat into victory and appropriately deal with complicated situations. Therefore, in training we must pay attention to these questions: First, we must make a great effort to "know the enemy"; we must know not only the enemy's weaknesses but also his strengths, and, in setting up training conditions, strive to make them conform to the tactical and technical characteristics of the enemy army, and thereby avoid his strength and attack his weakness so as to be victorious in battle. Second, we must both despise the enemy strategically and take him seriously tactically. We can neither "turn pale at the mention of a tiger" nor "be lulled into belittling a tiger." We must both "seek to learn from the enemy" and prevail over the enemy, winning victories with existing equipment. Third, we must study both positive and negative examples of battle, using for reference successful experiences

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and drawing lessons from defeats, seeking flexible tactics for dealing with the enemy and improving our mastery of the skills of modern warfare.

Fourth, we must deliberately arrange some training situations in which our side is losing, for example, being thwarted, being defeated or turning defeat into victory, training the commanders at every level to correctly judge the enemy's situation, to flexibly apply military force, to use the correct tactics, and to seize the initiative in battle so that, no matter under any conditions whatsoever, they will be unbeatable.

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XIAO KE SPEAKS AT MEETING OF MILITARY ACADEMIES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Jiao Wu [3542 2976]: "Liberating Thinking Is Key to Improving Teaching Quality in Colleges and Academies"]

[Excerpts] Military colleges and academies recently held a meeting to exchange teaching experiences. Comrade Xiao Ke, party committee secretary and president of a military college and concurrently its first political commissar, chaired the meeting and delivered a speech at it. Linking up the reality of teaching material compilation, academic research, and teaching reform in military colleges, he stressed in his speech that the liberation of thinking is the key question in improving teaching quality.

First of all, Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that the key question to improving teaching quality, raising the teaching to the level of modern warfare, is to liberate thinking. He said that in the past there had been many forbidden areas in teaching, which can be summarized in two sentences: the first was that what had been written could not be changed or developed; the second was that if something was not written down it could not be spoken of or thought about. The result was: everything in the past could not be moved forward and everything in the future had to be done to a pattern. Whoever did not do things in this way was labelled as one who was "chopping down the banner." In documents and speeches, there was much citing of the quotations [of Mao Zedong], taking the quotations as the criterion. This way of doing things by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" was much more devastating than what was done during the period of the Guangxi "left" doctrinairism. They waved the red flag to oppose the red flag and, in the name of Chairman Mao, made propaganda against other leaders and historical figures of the party, categorically refuting them and not allowing them to speak out. If you spoke out, then you were opposing Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought or denigrating Mao Zedong Thought. They were not permitted to teach military affairs, or if they were permitted to teach military affairs they had to do so from a purely military viewpoint, a purely technical and professional viewpoint.

Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that in order to liberate thinking we must stress the features of a future war and compile the required teaching materials that suit modern war. When we speak of teaching, first of all the questions of teaching content and teaching materials must be settled. Without teaching materials, how can we teach? If actors do not have a script, how can they perform? In the past



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in studying strategy and campaigns, nobody dared to study and discuss, and the study of strategy was confined to Chairman Mao's "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War." Now, we must study the strategy and tactics of people's war and military science under modern conditions. If we stick to the method of the Red Army during the Guangxi period of letting the enemy penetrate deeply, mechanically applying this method, then we will suffer a defeat. Because at that time we held no cities and had no modern industry, and got everything from the enemy, when the enemy came, we would "strengthen defense works, evacuate noncombatants, and hide provisions, entice the enemy to penetrate deeply, let go with both hands, and ask him to come in." If we were to copy indiscriminately this experience of the Guangxi period in a future war against aggression, how could it work? Based on the situation that has developed, we must study new tactics. Based on the standpoint, viewpoint, and methods of Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, we must write our own strategy for modern warfare. The four modernizations and the modernization of national defense pose the problem of modernized combat. Military academies must teach under modern conditions, and there must be modern teaching content. We must be determined to write teaching materials suited to modern warfare. Modernized teaching will enable the students to organize coordinated operations by land, sea, and air forces. What will we do if the middle- and upper-level commanders do not know how to command all service branches and arms? If one doesn't understand the knowledge pertaining to the sea and air forces, one cannot be a good military leader. This was true in the past and is also true at present. Therefore, the leading cadres at all levels must take the lead in studying modern military science and technology.

Comrade Xiao Ke pointed out that in liberating thinking there is the problem of the attitude in dealing with the experience of foreign countries and the experience in running colleges and academies in the past. After the 1958 counter doctrinairism, we did not dare to learn from foreign countries. Now, we must try hard to catch up with the requirements of the situation that has developed, and one important condition for doing this is that we break away, militarily, from the policy of closing the country to international intercourse, especially daring to learn from enemy armed forces, "making the enemy our teachers," and use them for our benefit. The characteristics of doctrinairism is that it divorces theory from reality. Only by proceeding from the reality of constructing our country and its armed forces, and maintaining the scientific attitude of learning, can we avoid and prevent doctrinairism. It is absolutely wrong to adopt a negative attitude toward the military academy presided over by Comrade Liu Bochong and the 17-year work of the armed forces colleges and academies. We must adopt the attitude of "one divides into two," viz, that successes are primary and shortcomings are secondary, that essentials are clearly distinguished from nonessentials, taking over the good aspects, further developing them and blazing new trails, and correcting what is uncorrect.

In conclusion, Comrade Xiao Ke said that we are command colleges and academies that train middle- and upper-level cadres, and our responsibility is heavy. We certainly must liberate our thinking, further straighten out the ideological line, and raise our consciousness for carrying out the line and the general and specific policies of the party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng. He said that after the ideological and political lines have been straightened out, the organizations must still be guaranteed, and, therefore, to bring up and train successors to the revolutionary cause is the important task of our military academies, is the glorious mission bestowed upon us by history.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DIVISION SETS GOOD LOGISTICS RECORD IN VIETNAM WAR

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Jiang Jilin [3068 0679 2651] et al.: "Those Who Command Must Look Ahead and Behind"]

[Text] Comrade editor:

We understand that, during this war of self-defensive counterattack, an outstanding job of insuring logistics was done by a certain division:

After the unit received its orders, in less than a day's time and in line with the upper level's demands, it completed every item of preparatory work for insuring logistics;

During the war, every time the unit urgently needed its ammunition or food replenished, the logistics personnel sent the required amount either before the order was received or punctually. In the division's hospitals, not one wounded soldier died because of insufficient care and treatment;

Tested in combat, the rate of weapons and vehicles received in good condition by the entire division was over 99 percent;

... .. [ellipses as published]

When we gathered their experiences in this respect for our news story, the first thing spoken of was the leaders' serious attention to logistics. In their own words, those who are the ones known to be in command in military and political work must look ahead and "behind." When we asked the division's commander and political commissar why they paid so much attention to logistics work, their talk never left the word "change."

They talked about three "changes."

The first is the change in weapons and equipment. Even if our weapons and equipment still lag behind those of the Soviet and American armed forces, there has been a great change, and supplying mullet plus rifles has changed into making heavy weapons primary. This change shows that combat cannot be sustained by the amount of ammunition, fuel, and food a unit can carry with it. The three heavy

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machineguns of a machinegun platoon in 14 hours fire 5,600 rounds. With this large an expenditure of ammunition, it must depend primarily on continual replenishment by logistics. If we were to say that, in the past, war supported itself, mainly obtaining weapons and equipment from the enemy, then now they are primarily obtained from the "rear."

The second change is the battlefield. Modern warfare is three-dimensional; specifically on a battlefield there is no sharp division between front and rear. The enemy's large-caliber artillery can hit a division's rear. In this war against Vietnam, the enemy basically had no usable aircraft and his artillery power was extremely limited, so that he could only adopt the method of surprise attacks by small detachments against our rear. This poses for us not only the problem of whether the rear can supply and relieve the troops but also the problem of whether it can protect itself. As warfare becomes more modernized, this latter problem becomes more acute.

The third change is in our logistical setup. In the past, the logistical transporters of a division or regiment were several horse-drawn carts and later several trucks. Now the logistical setup is much bigger and several hundreds of vehicles transport ammunition, fuel, and food to the front. On the move they form a line and when stopped, a large column, making a fairly big target. Suitable deployment zones, tight organizational command, and capable defense measures--all these things are matters for great concern.

After talking about these changes, the division's commander and political commissar sighed with deep emotion: Logistics, rear services--this word "rear" does not have the meaning it originally had. It is a decisive factor! Therefore, they held that it is necessary to correct the pet phrase popular in the unit--"equal consideration for military and political affairs."

The division's commander and political commissar told us: In the past the phrase "equal consideration for military and political affairs" was normally put forward by those of us in primary command of the division's military and political affairs. It is true that military work and political work cannot be absolutely separated. However, those who are in primary command are responsible for the overall work of the unit, and if one puts forward this pet phrase (or slogan), then where does one put logistics work? Logistics is an important part of the overall work of the unit. No matter whether in wartime or peacetime, it occupies an equally important position in the minds of those in primary command as does military work and political work. Whether in wartime or peacetime, the cadres in charge must "grasp logistics."

Their tentative method for grasping logistics was:

They assigned responsibility for logistics but did not separate themselves from logistics. In line with the characteristics of this war against Vietnam, they assigned a deputy commander of the division to exercise direct organizational command over logistics. But they assigned responsibility for logistics while not separating themselves from logistics. While directing the fighting at the front, they frequently inquired about the situation with regard to the work of

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insuring logistics and issued operational instructors. It is the same in peacetime, when, besides the deputy being in charge of logistics work, the division's commander and political commissar regularly concern themselves with this work. In the second half of last year, each regiment engaged in small-scale camp and field training in insuring logistics against a tactical background, and the political commissar, who manages work from headquarters, made inspections in the field on several occasions. At meetings of the divisional [party] standing committee, they repeatedly stressed that "logistics training must go forward." Thus, beginning in the second half of last year, training in logistics to meet the requirements of wartime was launched in every aspect in order to lay a foundation for this "fighting logistics."

They released the rear but did not allow the rear to be lost. In fighting a war, in order to prevent logistics from being "lost" in the rear, they took a series of measures. For example: They gave the logistics deployment an adequate number of communications tools so that during the entire course of a battle communication between the front and the rear command posts was maintained without a break; the commander's operational intent and the unit's plan of action were relayed as timely as possible to the rear command post, so that the work of insuring logistical support was prepared for and foreseen; and every time after the position was shifted, the division's commander and political commissar, if the situation permitted, would personally inspect the logistics deployment area, and if they discovered problems they promptly corrected them.

Logistics safeguards the unit, and the unit also safeguards logistics. Before the war, they gave consideration to the fact that the existing logistics establishment was unsuitable for fighting, so they appropriately beefed up the cadre contingent concerned. During the war, in order to deal with the Vietnamese army's habitual feature of making harassing attacks on our rear, besides improving the logistics unit's ability to defend themselves, from beginning to end they attached a reserve military force of one battalion (at a very few times two companies) to the logistics unit, vigorously increased the rear's strength to warn itself, defend itself, and protect its transport, and freed the logistics detachments from the fear of disturbances in their rear. From beginning to end in the war, the enemy was given no opportunity and could only direct sniper fire from distant mountain tops at our logistics, which came through unscathed.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFANTRY SCHOOL IMPROVES TRAINING BY USING VIETNAM WAR EXAMPLES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Xu Kedi [1776 0344 4877 et al.: "Use Actual Combat Experiences To Enrich Teaching Content"]

[Text] The Ji'nan Units Infantry School has paid full attention to using the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack on the China-Vietnam border in order to enrich its teaching content, improve its teaching methods, and raise its teaching quality.

The school has enriched its teaching content with models of battles in the war of self-defensive counterattack. Formerly, many examples of our army's battles in resisting American aggression and aiding Korea were taught in detail. The students' reaction to these battles was that they were far removed from the present, some did not suit the demands of modern warfare, and they were not very interesting to study. But the typical battles from the war of self-defensive counterattack, everybody felt, were not far removed from the present, were of practical significance, and what was said about them carried weight. Based on its own teaching content, each teaching and research section gathered together and put in order some examples of battles by units that had taken part in the war, thereby enriching its teaching and obtaining good results. The service arm teaching and research section collected information on battles in this war through three channels: by making extracts of relevant documents written and notices issued by upper levels concerning battles and data on them; by collecting reports published in newspapers on the course of, experiences in, and heroic deeds of the war; and by writing to border defense units in Guangxi and Yunnan that had taken part in the war and asking them about relevant battles. Afterward the section made comparisons, did research, and compiled the written materials that were then added to teaching materials and teaching plans. For the teaching on the 82 mm mortar alone, 12 battle examples were used, the teaching on armored troops used 10 battle examples, and the teaching was effectively coordinated. The political work and party history teaching and research section used the experience in political work of the units that had taken part in the war to enrich the teaching content related to wartime political work, and in every class examples taken from units that had taken part in the war were listed, a practice which was welcomed by the students.

The school assimilated both the positive and negative experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack, and led the students to improve their technical level

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and organizational command capability. First, the instructors synthesized the terrain features of Vietnam and clearly expounded to the students the position and function of terrain in combat, and moreover strengthened training in moving according to the azimuth under all sorts of terrain conditions. Second, the students studied examples of how the commanders at every level of the units that took part in the war repeatedly reconnoitered the enemy situation and the terrain, and, on this basis, made up their minds, thus making the students recognize the close connection between reconnaissance and deciding what to do, become aware of the important link of reconnaissance in the sequence of organizational command, and that it is an important basis for deciding what to do. Third, the instructors synthesized the combat experiences of units that had taken part in the war, educating the students to apply tactical principles with imagination, to judge the hour and size up the situation, and to flexibly wipe out the enemy. For example, in the tactical training for company-level attacks, the students learned how the units that had taken part in the war, focusing on the characteristics of the Vietnamese army's defensive deployment--what was exposed was false and what was concealed was true, combining the overt and the covert--employed the tactics of frontal pinning down, making flank attacks, tearing open a hole in the enemy line, rolling up both flanks, and springing out at the enemy from our interior positions and coming down on him from higher positions, showing the importance of the commanders being flexible in command. Fourth, the students learned the experiences and lessons of how the combined arms commanders of units that had taken part in the war applied each service arm in combat, so as to improve the students' organizational command abilities in combined arms operations. The armored forces teaching group, when teaching about the armored forces and the three forms of infantry-tank coordination, introduced lessons on how some commanders of the units that had taken part in the war had used amphibious tanks to storm fortified positions and had directed tanks to climb slopes that exceeded their technical capacity. At the same time, it introduced the frontline experience on how the 3d Battalion of a certain tank unit had, with its firepower, supported infantry in destroying 117 enemy firing points, as well as how a certain tank regiment had coordinated with infantry in an operation in which not one infantryman or tank was lost, and, comparing the positive and negative aspects, profoundly and vividly explained problems.

In line with the experiences of the units that had taken part in the war, the instructors enriched the training content with some actual combat requirements. With regard to the tactics of attack and defense at the squad level and below, they stressed good training in attacking enemy firing points with small groups over many routes and in attacking tanks, enriching the content with regard to trench warfare, search-and-destroy missions, and the cleaning up of the battlefield; the engineering class, based on the experiences and lessons of the war against Vietnam strengthened training in mine laying and removal; the antichemical warfare class enriched its content with the applied principles of the tactical and technical functions of flamethrowers and flamethrowing detachments; the artillery class strengthened organizational command training with regard to the shoulder-firing of the 82-mm recoilless rifle and the simple and convenient ways of firing the 82-mm mortar, and also strengthened the live-ammunition firing content; and the firing class added to its content firing while wearing gas masks and firing at aircraft.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFANTRY SCHOOL REFORMS TEACHING OF STAFF WORK

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Kao Shuhua [5072 2579 5478] et al.: "Let Battle Documents Be Geared To Actual Combat"]

[Text] In the teaching of and training in staff work in the Wuhan Units Infantry School, the students learn about and apply the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam. With speed in mind, the school has conscientiously streamlined and reformed battle documents. Good results have been obtained.

In the past in its teaching of and training in staff work, this school had given its students many assignments that consisted of writing battle documents, which occupied a large amount of their time. Many students raised this question: "Are all these battle documents produced by one battle?" The leaders of the school and its training department did conscientious research on the characteristics of headquarters work during the war of self-defensive counterattack and clearly saw: In a battle the situation changes suddenly and time is pressing, and this demands that documents be written and issued quickly. If the number of battle documents are excessive, this inevitably will create a strain on staff manpower, affect the timely understanding of the situation at lower levels, and affect the transmission to the lower levels of the commander's intentions and decisions. Therefore, the streamlining and reform of battle documents is an important topic in teaching staff work.

The leaders of the school and its training department mobilized the instructors and students to suggest ways and means for reforming battle documents. Through group assignments in education and training, they found out some methods for reforming battle documents. 1. Return orders for merging and make one piece of writing serve more than one purpose. By amalgamating into one document for transmission to lower levels directives that are more or less alike in content but that set down tasks that are not completely alike, we can reduce the number of documents and make one piece of writing serve more than one purpose. For example, when making assignments for writing directives on camouflage and air raid defense, if the directives are written separately, this will not only waste time and energy but also be duplicative. Consequently, the students merged the two directives into one document, so that the students raced against time and were trained in the ability to summarize. 2. By grasping quality and conciseness in writing, documents

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are made brief and to the point. In the past students of staff work, when writing documents setting down their prebattle orders, overstuffed their writing with regard to the part about the enemy's situation, and the documents were fairly long. During the teaching and training, the leaders of the school and its training department organized the students to study how to write the prebattle orders concisely. In their assignments, the students conscientiously polished their writing, deliberated carefully, and shortened, made pithy, and clear at one glance the documents containing prebattle orders. 3. By adopting formulated standard forms, the number of words in a document are reduced. The items on preprinted and compressed standard document forms are filled in. In this way, the number of words are few, time is saved, and standardization is enhanced. 4. By using all sorts of communications instruments to verbally transmit directives to lower levels, the number of written documents is reduced. In a battle there are many communications instruments of all sorts. By using these instruments to transmit directives and orders to the lower levels of a unit, the same result can be achieved as by writing documents. In teaching and training, the students use telephones, walkie-talkies, and signals to transmit directives and orders to the lower levels. This method, which only requires the writing of a simple outline and a little preparation and checking, is comparatively fast and convenient. 5. With regard to combined and separate orders, make separate orders primary. Orders can be written separately and transmitted to the lower levels separately in line with their greater or lesser importance and urgency, so that both the writing and the transmission are done quickly, thereby overcoming the faulty situation in which the transmission of combined orders to the lower levels ties up the communications instruments for too long a time, and meeting the requirements of actual combat.

Through the streamlined and reformed method for battle documents used by this school, the students are organized, in all sorts of weather, terrain, and conditions, to carry out training in actual assignments, so that the assignments are done quickly and with good quality. In the past, it took 2 or more hours to write a combined order. Now, to write four separate battle orders requires only about 1 hour. Everybody reported: This reform of staff work teaching based on the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack is extremely suited to the requirements of actual combat.

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SOUTH CHINA SEA FLEET EXPANDS NAVAL TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by Yu Linsen [0205 2651 2773]: "South China Sea Fleet Afloat Training Center Expands Training Scope. Classes of Naval Ships Doubled"]

[Text] The South China Fleet Afloat Training Center will expand the scope of its training this year. The number of classes of ships taking part in the first class will double over last year, and the number of trainees with triple. Preparations to begin training at the afloat training center are, by now, largely completed.

The afloat training center, which was established on a trial basis last spring, marked a major reform by the South China Fleet in the organization of training, its content, and methods in order to change the weakness in the technical underpinnings of the forces. The first group of naval vessels were trained quickly in short training cycles and with good quality of training, which earned the general acclaim of the forces.

In order to meet the needs for more training of specialties and of ships, around New Year's time, more than a month was set aside for personnel from surface craft groups and submarine groups to study the newly published "Ship Regulations," and "Regulations Pertaining to Ship Training," for conscientious summarization of the successful experiences and problems that existed in the training of the first group of ships, and for continued courageous improvements, supplements to, and readjustments in the content of training and methods of training for the various types of ships this year. They have already revised and made more complete 21 of the former training plans for guided missile escorts, and submarines, and 20 rules and regulations. They have also newly devised 18 training plans for submarine chasers and landing craft.

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CSO: 4007/2075

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ADVANCED WEAPONS SAID NOT WITHOUT LIMITATIONS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Shi Zhiyuan [4258 1807 6678]: "What Does the Return of Smoke Screens to Front Lines Show?"]

[Text] In October 1973, on the fourth day following outbreak of the Mideast War, Egyptian forces used portable "Sageer" [5646 2706 1422] anti-tank missiles, and were able after only 2 hours of use, to totally annihilate the Israeli 190 armorade brigade and take prisoner the brigade commander, Colonel Yaguli [0068 0657 6849]. After being severely hurt, Israel immediately coldly analyzed and studied new countermeasures, deciding to use as their principal countermeasure smokescreen cover. This method was very effective. Within a short time Israeli forces re-crossed the Suez Canal, and under cover of massive smokescreens, launched a counterattack against Egyptian forces in the Taosuo [one character illegible] [7118 4792 ? ] sector. Because of the smokescreen cover, the kill rate for Egyptian anti-tank missiles dropped, and an armored task force composed of several hundred commandoes successfully crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal in a single action on a pontoon bridge constructed by Egyptian forces south of Ismailia. Subsequently, Israeli forces made large scale use of all kinds of smokescreens, which played a substantial role in assuring combat mobility for military units.

This war experience offers food for thought. Given modern weapons and modern technical equipment, use of smokescreens for traditional screening, camouflaging, and confusing, had been thought by many to be seemingly out of date. In the 1960's, the United States began to disband its camouflage units, and in the 1970's, the Soviet Union also generally spoke of smokescreens in terms of not giving much attention to their development. After the role of smokescreens was made evident in the Mideast War, further attention of military forces in all countries of the world was aroused for a time, and use of smokescreens was evaluated anew. All countries acknowledge that modern warfare cannot be without cover, and that smoke-screens may be used to obstruct enemy use of advanced reconnaissance devices such as infra-red, electronics, and lasers in finding their objectives. In combat under nuclear conditions, smokescreens are also able to weaken the strength of radiation. Consequently, the American armed forces have worked up plans for the development of smokescreens, and the Soviet armed forces have put forward combat methods entailing use of smokescreens. In their maneuvers, the West German armed forces have made great use of smokescreen laying devices. Quite a few countries are also engaged in continued research and development of smoke emitting artillery shells, nautical shells, and rockets.

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The case of the "retiring" smokescreen, which deprived anti-tank missiles of their dominance, made people think. It demonstrated that the superiority of weapons and equipment is not omnipotent and the logic of "everything having its vanquisher." Under certain conditions, advanced weapons may lose their force or be unable to attain the full play of their intended force while relatively antiquated weapons and equipment may frequently play a role such as advanced weapons and equipment cannot easily play. China's armed forces had gotten rid of their 60 mm guns, but in self-defense combat against Vietnam, the 60 mm gun showed its mettle in annihilating dispersed and concentrated enemy forces operating from defilade. Flame-throwers, which were preparing to "say goodbye," also showed their skills in wiping out "moles" in self-defense combat against the Vietnamese.

This leads to the thought that in our study of the countermeasures of using inferiority to triumph over superiority, we must both bear in mind that future battlefields will be filled with modern weapons and equipment, and also realize fully and make the best use of the advantages of existing weapons and equipment. Contentment with the existing situation is not good, of course, but to shake one's head and sigh when looking at existing equipment should not be either. It must be understood that superior equipment has its weaknesses, and inferior equipment also has its strengths. A clear understanding of the adversary's weaknesses and our own strengths is an indispensable prerequisite of a policy for seeking to make the most of advantages while attacking disadvantages.

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SUPERIOR VS INFERIOR WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT REVIEWED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Li Kexin [2621 0668 0207], Chengdu Command: "Superior Versus Inferior"]

[Text] Logically speaking, superior equipment should triumph over inferior equipment, but in the history of warfare countless surprising cases have occurred in which inferior equipment triumphed over superior equipment. It may be seen that the triumph of the inferior over the superior positively was no accident.

In A.D. 1140, after Jin Wushu invaded the Central Plain and launched several injurious attacks against Yue Fei, he attacked Yue Fei in his encampment at Yancheng, using a "phalanx of horses" trained by Wanmutuoichi and Wanmutuoze. Five of Yue Fei's generals were killed in action when the opposing army's "phalanx of horses" launched spears and fired arrows. When Yue Fei heard the news, he said through tear-filled eyes: "I had known about the 'phalanx of armored horses,' which Hu Yanzhuo had used some years ago. Xu Ning reported that a 'phalanx of spears with hooks' can destroy them." In compliance with orders, Meng Bangjie and others began the training of soldiers in the use of a "phalanx of spears with hooks," later on finally defeating and routing the "phalanx of horses."

According to the description provided in "Shui Hu Zhuan," at the time Hu Yanzhuo's "phalanx of horses" was terrifying. "The men wore long helmets to protect their heads, exposing only their eyes. The horses were bedecked with heavy armor and decorated with red tassels with only their legs uncovered." "Thirty horses were placed in a single formation and locked together with iron rings. When they met the enemy, those formations in the distance used arrows and those close up used spears to thrust forward." In the eyes of the ancients, this "phalanx of horses" looked the way massed tanks look today. They were very awe-inspiring. According to Tang Long's description, there was nothing complicated about the "phalanx of spears with hooks." "All that is necessary is to make them, and then they can be used." In the same way that we regard rocket launchers today, they could only be considered light weapons. Nevertheless, that the easily fabricated "phalanx of spears with hooks" was able to triumph over the "phalanx of horses," which was unexcelled in all the world, certainly makes people think, does it not?

In combat, the superiority or inferiority of arms and equipment makes a very important difference between triumph and tragedy; however, no weapon or equipment

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is omnipotent. They all have shortcomings to match their strengths. Superiority in arms alone is no assurance of victory, and inferiority in equipment alone positively does not ordain defeat. The "phalanx of horses" was not able to save Jin Wushu from defeat, and the "phalanx of spears with hocks" won victory for Yue Fei's forces, which shows this principle. Napoleon paid close attention to the use of new material means in warfare, and he was a "military master" at devising new combat tactics, yet he resolutely rejected the view that arms and equipment superiority are decisive in victory or defeat in warfare. He said, "In warfare, morale and weapons count in a ratio of three to one." Aside from whether or not this is a correct proportion, that he gave attention to morale even when giving attention to weapons was correct beyond all doubt.

In comparison with China's major combat protagonists, the protagonists are superior and China is inferior in weapons and equipment. This is an objective reality. As economic construction develops, the weapons and equipment of China's armed forces will gradually improve, but no fundamental prospect of improvement is in sight during the short term. In order to win victory in a future war against aggression, the most realistic and the most reliable way is to find means in the use of existing armaments and seek countermeasures whereby inferiority can triumph over superiority.

Can victory be attained through existing armaments? This is the same as asking whether a way out can be found with existing armaments. I believe so! In his book, "The Bankruptcy of Atomic Strategy," the military theoretician most able in all the world to inspire the human heart, the French-born Czech, F.O. Mikexie [phonetic] [4717 0344 6200] made the following observation: "Well-trained soldiers frequently possess the ability to use simple weapons to destroy the enemy's complex weaponry. Such a capability increases daily as the large scale use of modern weapons increases (and the strength of highly mechanized military forces is determined by the proper use of these modern weapons). Consequently, simple weapons have become an effective means to checkmate complex, precision weapons. In life too, such situations frequently occur in which complex implements are hard put to counter simple implements; consequently it is still necessary to employ simple implements." This Czech has spoken eminently sensibly, and reality has long since attested to this. Wasn't the "phalanx of spears with hook" destruction of the "phalanx of horses," just such an extremely persuasive example of how simple weapons can triumph over complex weapons?"

In countering an enemy armed with modern weapons, if we have armaments more advanced than his, naturally nothing could be better. However, when one's armaments cannot catch up with those of one's enemies and one uses tanks to go up against the enemy's tanks, or pits airplane against the enemy's airplanes, one is bound to come to grief. Conversely, use of some insufficient indigenous armaments and simple weapons such as satchel charges or small rocket launchers in conjunction with flexible and ingenious tactics makes it possible to overwhelm the enemy's "T-72," or even the most advanced "T-80." Strange? Not at all. During the war of liberation as during the campaign to oppose American and aid Korea, our two legs often won the competition against the enemy's 10 wheels. This was not because motor vehicles do not run as fast as people, but because motor vehicle movements are limited by roads while people can climb mountains and ford streams. They can go even where the roads don't go. Were two-wheeled horsecarts used to

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pursue and attack the enemy's 10-wheeled trucks, they would be no match for the enemy, it is feared. The idea that "everything has its vanquisher" most certainly does not mean that the superior will overcome the inferior or that the foreign will overcome the indigenous. Many times the inferior can vanquish the superior, and the indigenous can vanquish the foreign. Things are strange in this way!

Naturally, simply because the inferior may triumph over the superior does not mean one will naturally be victorious without any need for objective efforts. It is very important to create conditions for the inferior to triumph over the superior. For example, study of the enemy's and our own strong and weak points, and real exploration and development of combat tactics whereby one's own strengths triumph over the enemy's weaknesses to constantly improve upon and master available arms and equipment, and make the maximum effective use of them is an indispensable condition for the triumph of inferiority over superiority. At that time, Xu Ning's phalanx of spears with hooks tactics employed spears that had seven hooks along the top and mid portion of the spears, and three hooks in concealed positions on the lower end. This entire set of tactics using spears was created with the strong and weak points of the "phalanx of horses" in mind. Had there been only the "phalanx of spears with hooks" without the numerous variations in tactical employment of the spears, they would not have been able to break the "phalanx of horses." All weapons can produce great force only when proficiently and effectively used, and when their use is linked to correct and compatible tactics.

Combat history also presents a phenomenon such as the following. Once a new weapon is born, in order to get fullest effectiveness from it in combat, a process of constant understanding, constant study, and constant development is necessary. The good men in Liangshan used the "phalanx of spears with hooks" to destroy the "phalanx of horses" of Hu Yanzhuo, and Yue Fei used similar methods to defeat Jin Wushu, but Yue Fei used broad swords in conjunction with the "phalanx of spears with hooks" to cut the horses legs in the "phalanx of horses," a tactic which more effectively developed the power of the "phalanx of spears with hooks."

Though people such as Fu Le [1381 0510] [phonetic], Lideer Hate [2621 1795 1422] [0761 3676] [phonetic], and De Gaulle theoretically explored the use of tanks, nevertheless, the potential of tanks was fully recognized by the German, Gudelian [0657 1795 6849 1344] [phonetic] and flexibly employed. Though our arms and equipment are fairly old, one cannot say that we are able to employ these weapons and equipment with the greatest proficiency possible, technically or tactically. In my view there is much that remains to be done in this regard, and a great potential to be tapped.

If I may go on for a few sentences more, this article positively does not deny the urgency and importance of developing new weapons and equipment. Could any who aspire to the building of a modern army not cease to want advanced weapons and equipment? The issue is that we cannot just sit and wait for advanced weapons and equipment, but must confidently endeavor to study tactical techniques whereby the inferior can overwhelm the superior. Use of available equipment to triumph over an enemy is not just wishful thinking; it is attainable in fact.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AIR FORCE UNIT PUTS FORTH INTEGRATED TRAINING PLAN

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Li Zhengxiang [2621 2973 4382] and Deng Yulin [6772 3768 2651]: "Certain Airforce Unit in the Airforce Proposes This Year's Integrated Training Plan"]

[Text] Report from KONGJUN BAO [Airforce News], 8 January. How will integrated training be done in this new year? Early last November a certain airforce unit in the Airforce convened an integrated training conference to summarize experiences, in which they proposed to proceed from the simple to the complex, and from the known to the unknown.

As of the end of October last year, each of the divisions of this airforce unit organized four to six integrated training sessions to explore in a preliminary way some experiences. The sessions also revealed some problems. After full study of problems in last year's integrated training, they proposed concrete ideas and plans as follows. Divisions will continue once monthly training exercises, and armies will hold them once each quarter. Organizationally, the ranking officer will be in charge. Combat and training units will work together and jointly take charge, with combat units making up schedules and training units making plans in a system that divides and combines tasks with the emphasis on combining. Individual training results will be reflected in the air. Prominence goes to officers in charge of training, and officers in charge will sing "the leading role" in combat. This year's training plans call for divisional and wing officers in charge to be given integrated command classes and study integrated command skills. Pilots should intensify their study of enemy military strength and tactics and disabuse themselves of wishful thinking.

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ENGINEERING CORPS REGIMENT HOLDS COMBINED-ARMS TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Chen Xinnian [7115 2450 1628]: "In Order to Create the Conditions For Doing a Good Job in Next Year's Training, Regiment of a Certain Engineering Unit Focuses On Assembling Battalion, Company, and Platoon Cadres for Training"]

[Text] From early to mid-January, a certain engineering regiment in the Wuhan Command focused on filling in gaps by taking firmly in hand assembly for training of battalion, company, and platoon cadres in order to increase cadre command capabilities and teaching levels, thereby creating conditions for doing a good job in training in the coming year.

The assembling of cadres for training in advance of the beginning of training is something the regiment does annually. In former years, this assembling for training simply used a uniform training method in accordance with annual training plans in a step by step, simple preparation of classes, with insufficiently serious attention being given cadre command capabilities and teaching levels. As a result, not many breakthroughs ever occurred in unit training. This year, the Regiment CCP Committee determined to change this state of affairs. Taking account of cadre lack of study of the tactics of engineering troops during combat involving combined forces, and the major ingredients in this year's applied training in tactics, they organized cadres taking the training to concentrate on the study and exploration of how, in the course of offensive combat involving combined forces, mobile safeguarding units blaze a trail for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, how they reconnoiter and remove mine fields and other obstacles from in front of enemy positions, how they construct for all branches of service urgently needed defense works of all kinds, and how they camouflage various kinds of fortifications. Following more than 2 weeks study and exploration, the cadre trainees drafted a 14 point tactical thinkpiece and a 92 point lesson plan for safeguarding the combined forces in combat, which took account of the enemy's equipment, combat characteristics, and reconnaissance methods. In addition, they used these lesson plans and think pieces in follow-up teaching demonstrations and simulated exercises.

When the training was over, the cadres summarized two major advantages of this kind of assembling for training. First, it was valuable in pooling the efforts and wisdom of everyone for a vigorous attack on trouble spots, and in increasing cadre command capabilities and the level of their teaching skills. Formerly, many cadres had only a superficial understanding of these courses. This time, however,



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as a result of everyone putting the situation on the table and showing difficulties for joint study of ways to break the enemy's plans, battalion, company, and platoon cadres were able to organize, within the scope of their own echelon, actions by mobile safeguarding units and barrier emplacement units to handle various kinds of complex situations. Second, it was valuable in increasing the level of tactical skills of units. Formerly, cadres themselves were unable to explain clearly the content of this training, and the more the soldiers listened to them, the more confused they became. Now, cadres at all echelons are able to organize fairly well, to carry into effect, and to teach this important course, and the soldiers are able to study and practice it more.

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ARMY UNIT HOLDS COMBAT TRAINING IN FORTIFIED POSITION DEFENSE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Chai Wu [2693 0702] and Ke Jun [4430 6511]: "Certain Army Readjusts Training Deployments in Accordance with Strategic Plans; Emphasizes Strong Positional Defense Combat Courses"]

[Text] Acting in accordance with strategic policy readjustments in training plans decided on by the Central Military Affairs Commission, a certain army of the Beijing Command has decided this year to stress strong positional defense combat training.

In laying out its training plans, this army has diligently carried out the Military Affairs Commission's strategic plan for active defense, in a change from the former disjointedness between the content of training and unit combat tasks. Starting with the characteristics of the combat zone, it has required units responsible for holding fast in defensive combat tasks to emphasize study of problems in how to use strong positions, how to hold fast for long period of time, and independent combat. Units responsible for reserve unit tasks will mainly study how to conceal high speed ground mobility, how to rely on nucleus positions to launch counterattacks, how to engage in combat against airborne troops, and how to coordinate with militia in the combat zone to launch guerrilla warfare. Logistical organizations and companies will study mostly problems in how to eat, live, and fight in conditions of extreme cold. In order to improve training quality, this unit also decided that this year's tactical exercises will be moved, to the maximum extent possible, to selected combat zones where training will take place. Units distant from the combat area will also, insofar as possible, select similar terrain for training; units will thereby become familiar with prescribed combat plans.

At the present time, headquarters of this unit is in process of studying positional warfare, particularly a series of problems in positional warfare under conditions of intense cold in order to formulate for the forces positional warfare training plans. The organization has already issued all training materials to the company level. Five advanced companies have begun training to gather training experiences for the unit.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BEAT SUPERIOR FORCES WITH INFERIOR FORCES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by staff reporters Zhao Jun [6392 7786] and Yang Songlin [2799 2646 2651]: "Make Efforts To Master the Skills To Handle Existing Weapons and Equipment; To Enhance Combat Capabilities To Beat Superior Forces With Inferior Forces, a Certain Army Stresses Readjustment of Basic Training"]

[Text] To enhance the combat capabilities of troops to beat superior forces with inferior forces, key responsible cadres of divisions and regiments subordinate to a certain army were called together for a study session during the last 10 days of January. They unanimously held that time and energy should be devoted to mastering skills to handle existing weapons and equipment.

A typical case was analyzed in the course of discussion. Previously, an overwhelming majority of the companies had had a very high hit accuracy when they practiced basic firing. At the end of last year, however, the percentage of hits was very low when the army assessed several outstanding companies in tactics-related background. Everybody should notice from these instances that although our weapons and equipment are not up to date, they cannot be used with maximum efficiency, because we have not developed the necessary skills in handling them. If we desire to beat superior forces with inferior forces, it is necessary to concentrate our efforts on mastering basic skills to handle existing weapons and equipment.

In line with this thinking, basic training for the first half of this year was rearranged and readjusted. Training in positional defense warfare in every unit was made to center on combat missions and on the characteristics of a future war theater and they strengthened positional defense combat training. It was further urged that more time and energy be put into hard efforts to master the basic skills of the "three ways of fighting and the three defenses" and the cadre basic skills of organization and command. Moreover, during the period of basic training, every training division or regiment must conduct separate combined-arms training instead of the "all-cooked-in-the-same-pot" type of training.

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They also proposed that: 1. Space, equipment, ammunition and funds be allocated and utilized in a scientific manner, which would enable limited material conditions to come into full play; 2. Popularizing a rational plan for the utilization of space, equipment, and instructors called the "9 Step Tank Attack Training Method," produced by a certain regiment by drawing on the experience of other units; 3. Popularizing the experience of a certain division's artillery regiment which provided a several-fold increase in the opportunity of company commanders to organize and lead live-ammunition practice without increasing the amount of ammunition used. Besides, energetic support must be given to develop troop training through thrift and hard work, use substitutes and simulation equipment to the full, and to accomplish more at small expense, or even at no expense at all.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NEW TACTICS OF ATTACKING TANKS BY INFANTRYMEN ADVOCATED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Wu Zhen [0702 7201]: "The Training Method of Attacking Tanks by Infantrymen Must Be Changed"]

[Text] To, at present, utilize our army's tanks with their existing equipment to safeguard an effective attack on tanks by infantrymen, as I see it, poses several problems which deserve our serious attention.

First, the quality of training fails to meet the anticipated demands. Training of the troops in peacetime usually conforms to the infantry's demands and a majority of the tanks are individual vehicles. They also move at such a speed that the foot soldiers can climb up on them or hand up satchel charges to facilitate attacks on other tanks. It is impossible to acquire first-rate combat capabilities by this training method because the enemy's attack is expected to assemble a large number of tanks in a definite combat formation and carry out a high-speed assault in great depth supported by intense air and artillery fire along with the coordinated efforts of the infantry. (At worst, the enemy might use nuclear weapons as well as chemical weapons.) It is highly unlikely that the enemy would move slowly with individual tanks to meet our attack. Undoubtedly, to deal with the enemy's tank attack by our present method of attacking tanks by infantrymen will invite disaster.

Second, our present method is simply not economical. One Chinese-made tank is worth several hundred thousand yuan. One motor-hour costs 350 yuan. The armies of the economically much more powerful nations such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France still cannot afford to use equipped tanks as safeguard vehicles in tank-attack training, but we have been doing so all along. In 1980, the tank regiments subordinate to various armies and divisions averaged 200 motor-hours in supporting tank-attack training by the infantry. It cost 70,000 yuan for a tank regiment alone. How much would it have cost for a whole army? Troop training must be economical. In view of our nation's weak economic capabilities, we cannot very well avoid considering this problem.

Third, a tank is a combat weapon which should not be treated as a safeguard vehicles used in training. In peacetime if a tank is used as a target to train the infantry to attack tanks, blasted by satchel charges or hit by "concrete bombs" [3055 3136 1734], this turn of events would affect not only

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the tank's outward appearance, but also damage its spare parts. This would directly result in a decline in the level of tank combat readiness on the one hand and an increase in the loss of combat ready vehicle motor-hours on the other.

And fourth, a prerequisite for fighting in coordination is to train in combined arms. Since the problem of tank-attack training was raised, the infantry and tank units have been carrying out their basic training separately. The tank units sent tanks to the infantry's training area to be used as target vehicles. Combined training and joint maneuvers were both scarce. With little or no combined training, not only would it be difficult for the infantry to master the real skills needed to attack enemy tank masses, but the commanding officers of combined arms units would be incapable of or not very good at organizing combined operations.

In the light of our nation's present economic situation and for the purpose of enhancing the combat capabilities of infantry subunits to attack tanks and raising the level of coordinated infantry-tank combat, it is my suggestion that the motor-hours used for supporting tank-attack training by infantrymen should be concentrated and used for the coordinated training of the infantry and tanks and for joint maneuvers of the various arms. In that case, can we abandon the training of attacking tanks by infantrymen? The answer is that this training must be carried on. However, its method should be revised. It may be conducted jointly with individual vehicle, platoon and company tactical training and with tank driving firing training. For instance, when tank driving training is in progress, the infantry subunits in groups may, on the driving ground or in the nearby area where tanks pass, take advantage of favorable terrain and grasp the moment when the tanks change speed or cross barriers to practice skills and tactics for attacking them. Moreover, when tank subunits practice training firing and combat firing at a range, they may arrange that their firing practice be observed by infantry subunits. Because tank firing in all parts of the world appears to be very much the same, observing our army's tank firing practice will be helpful not only in organizing coordination between the infantry and tank units, but also in studying the method of attacking the enemy tank concentrations. This kind of training will not only solve the problem of the training ground, equipment and material used in the training of attacking tanks by infantrymen, but will be close to actual combat conditions and tally with the tradition of training through thrift and hard work.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REGULATIONS RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Li Guozhong [2621 0948 1813] and Song Keyun [1345 0344 0061]:  
"Shenyang Units Armored Force Formulates Ten Regulations in a Standardized  
Training Order for Units and Below the Battalion Level"]

[Text] In the latter part of January various units under the Shenyang Units armored force began implementing the "10 regulations in a standardized training order for units at and below the battalion level" which were worked out by the leadership organ of the armored force. Commanders and fighters said, With this set of standardized training order, basic training is bound to achieve results.

In the latter part of last year, when the leadership organ of the Shenyang Units armored forces was testing and evaluating the units' training, it was discovered that basic training was still a weak link. They felt that although there were numerous reasons for it, the most important is that the units, especially the fenderis at and below the battalion level, lacked a set of specific and systematic standardized training order. Some companies did not show enough conscientious effort in following the training outline and manual and, in training, did not do things in order such as going from basic to applied training and from technical to tactical training. Hence, training operations were random not unified. Although the upper-level leadership organ had formulated and issued various training regulations, they were nonetheless quite loosely adhered to when implemented at fenderis at and below the battalion level. In order to resolve this problem, the leadership organ of the armored force summed up past experiences, drew lessons from them and worked out the "10 regulations in a standardized training order for units at and below the battalion level," ensuring that basic training is on the right track and is effectively carried out.

The "regulations" provided a workable guideline for training personnel, time, content and quality. Everything from instructors teaching to students learning, from inside the classrooms to out on the training ground and from regular course education to daily cultivation are done with specific and clear regulations. The "regulations" brought out the cadres' exemplary leadership roles and encouraged them to act as examples in implementing various rules and regulations.

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FORTIFIED POSITION DEFENSE COMBAT EXERCISE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Yang Zhiqi [2799 1807 3823] and Hu Haiping [5170 3189 1627] of the Wuhan Units: "Which Combat Method Should Be Deployed?"]

[Text] A reinforced 82mm recoilless artillery gun platoon of the 3d infantry company of the red team is set up by the upper level to conduct fortified position defense in the Jiaoshan area. To the east of the defensive position is Hill 315 and to the west is Jiaoshan. The terrain between these two high grounds is somewhat flat and a highway runs deep through the bottom of a thin bag.

At the main strong point trenches for soldiers and bunkers for weapons are built and wire-mesh and antitank barriers are put up at places where tank movement is unobstructed. The 1st and 2d platoons are separately defending the two strongholds at the east and west sides while the 3d platoon, as a reserve unit for the company, is positioned in the back.

A reinforced company of the right flank of the 6th tank regiment of the blue team has already moved into battle formation, getting ready to launch an attack against the 3d company in an attempt to break through its defense. The company moved along the highway in a roundabout southeast direction to link up with its main forces. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the red team reported the situation to the commander of the 3d company and asked, "On the basis of this situation, is your company going to fight by letting the enemy penetrate your position or destroy him in front of your position, or are you going to employ another combat method?"

We ask that comrades think this over for the commander of the 3d company of the red team and see what combat method should be used.

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PLA UNITS URGED TO STUDY, IMPLEMENT PARTY'S POLICIES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 1

[News report: "Military Units Strengthen Political and Ideological Work"]

[Text] In the course of studying and implementing the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference, PLA units in Nanjing, Chengdu, Kunming, Lanzhou and Urumqi; the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission; and armored, engineer, and capital construction engineering corps have discussed and studied measures for upholding the four basic principles and for strengthening political and ideological work, in conjunction with what they really have in mind with regard to work. They have encouraged PLA units to act as masters of their own country, to carry forward the spirit of hard struggle, and to resolutely implement the party's principles and policies aimed at further readjusting the economy and bringing about greater political stability.

A series of meetings has been called by party committees of these units to conscientiously convey and study the documents of the Central Committee Work Conference. By accurately analyzing the current situation, they have achieved a clear understanding of the requirements for the further readjustment of the national economy, as well as of its far-reaching significance. On that basis, they have focused their attention on a discussion of how to uphold the four basic principles and how to gear political and ideological work to serve the need for readjusting the economy. At an enlarged meeting of the standing committee of the party committee, principal leading comrades of PLA units in Urumqi pointed out: The army must be determined to maintain political unity with the Party Central Committee. It is necessary to study and implement the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference and to study basic theories. Only in this way can we clearly understand the relationships between allegiance to the four basic principles and the emancipation of the mind, between the development of socialist democracy and the improvement of the socialist legal system, and between allegiance to party leadership and the thorough implementation of the "double hundred" policy, and can we further increase our consciousness of the need to uphold the four basic principles. At a work conference, the party committee of the PLA units in Nanjing stressed: At present, various ways must be devised and bold steps must be taken to strengthen education in the four basic principles, which will lead commanders and fighters to understand more clearly the current situation and firmly implement the line, principles, and policies adopted since the Third Plenary Session. The meeting also studied specific measures for improving education. The leading organs of PLA units in Lanzhou called on vast numbers of cadres, and especially the leading cadres, to take the lead in upholding the four basic principles,

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to step up investigation and study with a high sense of political responsibility, to do a good job in the ideological field, and to unify the thinking of cadres and fighters behind the party's line, principles, and policies. In the course of study, leading comrades of the engineer corps have held special meetings to discuss the relationship between the building of spiritual civilization and that of material civilization. They have also offered specific opinions on how to strengthen political and ideological work and build a high-level spiritual civilization.

In the course of study and discussion, some units have conscientiously reviewed the experiences and lessons in economic construction that we have accumulated since the founding of new China. Through this review, they have further realized that "left" deviationist ideology is a big obstacle in the way of efforts to implement the party's principles and policies, to readjust the economy, and to preserve stability and unity, and that therefore it should be completely eliminated as a shackle of the people's minds. The enlarged meeting of the standing committee of the party committee of PLA units in Kenming pointed out: Even today, some people still have not been able to free themselves from the shackles of "leftist" ideology. These comrades always observe problems with "left-leaning" eyes, regarding the correct principles and policies adopted since the Third Plenary Session as a deviation from the correct course. This "leftist" influence will certainly have an adverse effect on the effort to maintain political and ideological unity with the Party Central Committee. Comrades who attended the meeting also discussed the problem of how to eliminate "left" deviationist ideology. This problem was studied by principal leading comrades when they presided over a forum. Comrades attending the forum stressed the need to conscientiously organize a study of dialectical and historical materialism in conjunction with the implementation of the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference and in a way that takes into account actual conditions. They also emphasized the need to study political economy, to eliminate chaos and restore order on the theoretical front, to rectify the ideological line, and to bring the thinking of commanders and fighters into line with the party's principles and policies.

After completing a study program for themselves, party committees of many PLA units have conscientiously encouraged various units to study and implement the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference. Leading comrades of PLA units in Chengdu have visited offices and units, giving them instructive reports, and applying what they have learned as a result of study by cadres and fighters to solve problems. The party committee of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission has studied a series of specific measures for conscientiously carrying out scientific research and experimental projects, for scaling down capital construction, for strengthening military education and training, for consolidating finance departments, for practicing frugality and economy, for promoting production, for strengthening political, ideological, and organizational work, for rectifying workstyles, for strictly disciplining people, and for improving the party's workstyle. Leading members of the party committee of the Capital Construction Engineering Corps were divided into groups to visit six units which assume relatively heavy responsibility to readjust the scale of capital construction. While there, they invited cadres to talks in order to become acquainted with their ideas, examine their implementation of policies, and solve problems with well-defined objectives in mind. At a time when budgets and construction investments are being cut, leaders at all levels have stepped up investigation and study, have encouraged the masses to suggest ways and means, and have urged those at the top and others at the bottom to work with one mind and one heart, share the burdens of the state, carry forward the spirit of hard struggle, and strive to serve the PLA units well.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROBLEMS OF COMBATING BETTER EQUIPPED ENEMY STUDIED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Chen Hongwu [7115 3163 2976] and Lei Ming [7191 7686] of the Nanking Army Academy: "Apply Inferior Force To Defeat a Superior Force and Seek Truth From Facts"]

[Text] Highlights: To defeat a superior power, an inferior power must size up the actual situation of both sides and study strategy on the basis of seeking truth from facts. We should avoid underestimating favorable defense conditions and heroic human spirit, on the one hand, but on the other we should oppose any tendency to overestimate human factors and disregard material conditions. The concept of pitting one against ten or of pitting ten against a hundred generally refers to the political quality of the proletarian army from a strategic point of view. It is closely tied to another concept concerning the balance of specific combat and tactical forces. But any attempt to confuse the two is not permitted. It seems more realistic to base the study of future defensive warfare on the concept of pitting one against one.

In a future war against aggression, we will have to employ inferior equipment in counterattacks against an enemy who has superior weapons. This is why we are required to exhibit confidence that we can defeat a superior power with inferior equipment, to take into account the actual conditions of both sides--ourselves and the enemy--and to seek truth from facts in considering problems and studying policies. Under no circumstances should we harbor any unrealistic illusions in this connection. For example, how many enemy soldiers one of our own soldiers can conquer in defensive warfare is a problem that needs to be analyzed by seeking truth from facts.

At present, opinions are divided over this issue. One opinion holds that in modern defensive warfare, an inferior army can conquer an enemy force three times greater than its own if it can give full play to its latent superior potential as defenders. (In other words, one of our divisions can resist three enemy divisions.) Another opinion maintains that in confrontation with an enemy army with equipment that is superior to ours, it is not easy to maintain a ratio even of 1 to 1 on the battlefield. (In other words, one of our divisions can be committed to fight one enemy division.) Which opinion actually is correct?

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We must realize that in modern defensive warfare, the number of enemy soldiers one of our soldiers is equal to in terms of fighting capability cannot be determined by man's subjective wishful thinking but by a realistic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages and the strengths and weaknesses on both sides of the dispute. On this matter, we should avoid underestimating favorable defense conditions and heroic human spirit, on the one hand, and on the other we should oppose any tendency to overestimate human factors and disregard material conditions. The concept of pitting one against ten or pitting ten against a hundred generally refers to the political quality of a proletarian army from a strategic point of view. It is closely tied to, but cannot be confused with, another concept of the specific balance of combat and tactical forces thrown onto the battlefield by both sides. The reason is that combat strength consists not only of human factors and man's death-defying courage but also of weapons and equipment, both inferior and superior, and of tactics and skills in using these weapons and equipment. If we insist on emphasizing human spiritual factors in the face of enemy weapons that are far superior to ours, it will be just as Lenin sharply criticized, "It is foolish to pit human waves against artillery fire and to use pistols to defend fortresses." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 1, p 669)

During the early stages of a future war against aggression, an enemy who has equipment far superior to ours will attempt to end the war and win victory as soon as possible through the use of powerful modern weapons, backed by a highly efficient command system. This being the case, we feel that it is more realistic to study the problem on the assumption of a 1:1 ratio on the battlefield.

To defeat a superior power in defensive warfare, an outnumbered inferior power should possess specific favorable conditions. For example: well-selected defense positions at strategic points that can easily be defended; full preparations for war; close coordination in action; seizure of the initiative to attack fatigued enemy troops; and so on and so forth. Among these conditions, however, strength is the most essential. "Inferiority" and "small numbers" are relative terms and should remain at a specific level. If the equipment is so "inferior" and the number of soldiers is so "small" that they cannot resist the enemy and win victory, no favorable conditions will exist for the defenders. Furthermore, balance of power does not refer merely to a balance of quantities. More importantly, it refers to a balance of qualities. When the characteristics of weapons and equipment are comparable on both sides, quantity will spell an important difference between superiority and inferiority. When there is disparity in weapons and equipment, the side with numerical superiority cannot be considered to be the superior power; nor can the side with superior quality but numerical inferiority be viewed as an inferior power.

In the era of cold, or nonexplosive, weapons, there was a popular saying: "One man at a strategic point can resist 10,000 invaders." How could he do that? The reason was that the weapon held by that outnumbered defender at a strategic point and the weapons used by the 10,000 invaders, which included axes and long spears, were similar in characteristics; as long as he could hold the line at the strategic point, he could certainly head off the invaders' attacks. With the introduction of hot, or explosive, weapons, this type of warfare is gone forever. As modern science and technology are applied in the military field and the range and firepower of weapons become greater than ever, defenders, especially those with inferior weapons, are obviously becoming less and less capable of resisting enemy troops equipped with superior arms.

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During the first round of the war in defense of the Soviet Union, the number of artillery pieces [that the Soviets] deployed ranged from two to five per kilometer, which proved ineffective in holding the line. During the third round of the war, the Soviet Army deployed 25 to 30 and even as many as 87 antitank artillery pieces per kilometer, thus putting it in a better position to halt the waves of advancing German tanks. When the battle for Stalingrad began, the ratio of defenders to attackers was 1:1.4 in manpower, 1:1 in firepower, 1:2 in tank force, and 1:3.5 in air power, thus putting the Soviet army in an unfavorable position. This battle did not end until the armed forces on both sides were even and the Soviet tanks became slightly predominant on the battlefield.

In the series of defensive wars fought by our army, the ratio of defenders to attackers also changed from time to time. During the battle of interception at Tanshan, one column (which commanded three divisions) of our army succeeded in repelling attacks mounted by 11 Chiang divisions. This means that on the average one division of our army equaled 3.7 Chiang divisions. During the defensive war of resistance against the United States in support of Korea, our army had to commit an average of 1.2 to 1.6 divisions to confront one enemy division armed with modern weapons, because [our army] was equipped with slightly inferior weapons. This was a new picture for our army, which in its wars of defense historically had resorted to numerical superiority to win victory.

In modern defensive warfare, large-scale tank offensives have replaced attacks mounted by foot soldiers--a striking contrast to the war of resistance against the United States in support of Korea. One heavily armored T-72 tank consists of one cannon with a caliber of 85 millimeters, one machinegun for antiaircraft defense, one heavy machinegun, and three carbines. It can move at a speed of 200 to 300 meters per minute. Resistance against such a tank, or a tank platoon or a tank company, has nothing in common with resistance against a foot soldier, or an infantry platoon or company of the past. Any stubborn advocacy of pitting one against three or even more, in disregard of objective reality, is obviously unrealistic.

We must work out a new strategy for an inferior power to defeat a superior power by taking into account this changing situation. In figuring out the balance of forces between our antitank bazookas and the enemy tanks to be targeted, we cannot just count numbers and disregard quality. Even if we can commit two antitank bazookas (excluding antitank guided missiles) to fight one enemy tank, this does not mean that the enemy forces have been outnumbered by 2 to 1 in our favor, because we will still be inferior to the enemy in terms of quality. When one of our infantry divisions is committed to defend the frontline, it should be deployed in such a way that its defensive formation will not be any longer than the enemy tank offensive formation. To counter wave upon wave of advancing enemy tanks, attention must be paid to increasing the intensity of antitank bazookas and to strengthening the defense network on the frontline. Special arms must be reinforced with the necessary aviation and artillery units and armored and engineer corps so that they can achieve what should be achieved for defense purposes.

A major tactic in combat during the early stages of war is to firmly hold the defense line. In order to stop the enemy troops from breaking through the vital defense line, the tactic of pitting one against one is certainly a reliable measure for an inferior power to resist a superior power. But the tactic of pitting

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one against one is by no means absolute. For example, the tactic of pitting one against two or three, or even against four and five, may be effective in countering enemy attacks at strategic geographic points where the enemy troops cannot easily be deployed and on the secondary defense front. It may also be effective when defensive measures are taken to support offensive campaigns, when superior forces are being concentrated to mount attacks, and when defensive maneuvers are deemed necessary to trade space for time.

In short, the problem of how many enemy attackers one of our soldiers can repel in modern defensive warfare should be studied by taking into account the actual situation and by seeking truth from facts. Right-deviationist conservatism is wrong; also harmful to our military operations is an unrealistic assessment of the enemy situation from the "leftist" point of view.

Likewise, in analyzing other problems concerning the application of inferior equipment to defeat a superior power, the slightest departure from the principle of proceeding from reality and seeking truth from facts is harmful.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFORMATION ON MILITARY, OTHER PERSONNEL

[The following biographic information is taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

Bi Tinghou [5643 1694 0624] is identified as commander of the Yili Military Subdistrict. (28 Sep 79 p 2)

Chen Yinglin [7115 5391 3829] is identified as political commissar of an unidentified regiment of the Lanzhou Units. (24 Sep 79 p 3)

Chen Yuchen [7115 3768 3819] is identified as commander of the Lianyuan Military Subdistrict in Hunan Province. (28 Dec 80 p 3)

Deng Dongzhe [6772 2639 0772] is identified as deputy political commissar of an engineering corps. (10 Mar 81 p 2)

Du Qingyi [2629 1987 5030] is identified as a political commissar of an unidentified regiment of the Beijing Units. (28 Sep 79 p 1)

Feng Hengfa [7458 1854 4099] is identified as commander of an unidentified regiment of the Lanzhou Units. (24 Sep 79 p 3)

Fu Zhixiao [0265 1807 1321] is identified as commander of the 1st Battalion of an unidentified unit which is stationed on an island. (28 Dec 80 p 3)

Gong Ke [1362 0344] is identified as political commissar of an unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)

He Hongqiu [0149 1347 3808] is identified as commander of a motor vehicle regiment of the Shenyang Units. (12 Mar 81 p 2)

Huang Renshou [7806 0088 1108] is identified as deputy commander of an unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)

Ji Zuozhen [0495 0155 4176] is identified as commander of the 4th Company of an unidentified border defense regiment of the Heilongjiang Military District. (28 Sep 79 p 2)

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Li Daren [2621 1129 0088] is identified as deputy commander of an unidentified regiment of the Chengdu Units. (30 Jan 81 p 1)

Li Yi [2621 3015], member of the 5th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and former deputy chief of the Political Department of the Armored Forces, died in Beijing at the age of 70 from an undisclosed illness on 15 February 1981. (24 Feb 81 p 4)

Li Zhengyi [2621 2973 5030], deputy commander of an unidentified regiment of the Shenyang Units, headed an innovations team which recently developed a simulated trajectory laser firing practice device that saves training expenses. A photo shows him instructing comrades of the 2d Squad of an 85mm artillery company how to use the device in antitank training. (3 Mar 81 p 1)

Lin Zhimao [2651 3112 5399] is identified as regimental commander of an unidentified army of the Shenyang Units. (25 Sep 79 p 1)

Mei Zhanrong [2734 0594 2837], former deputy chief of staff of the Qinghai Military District Headquarters, has served as an advisor since February of last year because of his poor health. (2 Feb 81 p 2)

Qin Shengyun [4440 0524 0061] is identified as commander of an unidentified antiaircraft artillery division. Under the assistance of the logistics department, he successfully improved a loading device to align such weapons and equipment as artillery guns and radars on flat-bed cars. (20 Feb 81 p 2)

Ren Fengjie [0117 7364 2638] is identified as political commissar of an artillery regiment. (1 Feb 81 p 1)

Shi Gengsheng [2457 2577 3932] is identified as a deputy commander of an unidentified radar regiment of the Lanzhou Air Force. He was commended as a good Lei Feng-type cadre. (20 Feb 81 p 1)

Song Peizhou [1345 1014 0719], commander of an unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units, led an inspection team to go into the companies to check on weapons and equipment. (27 Sep 79 p 1)

Song Shaoji [2646 4801 1015] is identified as regimental commander of an unidentified unit. (1 Feb 81 p 2)

Tang Caiying [3282 2088 5391] is identified as deputy political commissar at a state farm which belongs to an unidentified division of the Shenyang Units. (1 Feb 81 p 1)

Wang Yishan [3769 4135 1472] is identified as commander of an unidentified antiaircraft artillery regiment stationed in Beijing. (8 Feb 81 p 1)

Wang Zhangyu [3769 4545 3768] is identified as commander of an unidentified unit of the Chengdu Units. (2 Feb 81 p 2)

Xie Cai [6200 2088] is identified as deputy commander of the Beijing Garrison Command. (3 Mar 81 p 4)



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Xue Wentao [5641 2429 3325] is identified as commander of a "model combat battalion" of an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units. (20 Feb 81 p 1)

Yao Lufan [1202 1462 4636] is identified as deputy commander of an unidentified army of the Nanjing Units. (8 Jul 79 p 1)

Yin Chengfu [1438 2052 1381] is identified as commander of an unidentified airborne battalion. (17 Jul 79 p 2)

Yu Lingzhang [0060 0109 4545] is identified as deputy chief of staff of the Jianyang Military Subdistrict headquarters. (25 Sep 79 p 1)

Zhang Tianfu [1728 1131 1381] is identified as a regimental commander of an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units. (20 Feb 81 p 1)

Zhao Jinmei [6392 2516 5019] is identified as deputy commander of the 2d Battalion of an unidentified engineering corps regiment of the Shenyang Units. (3 Mar 81 p 2)

Zheng Yong [6774 0516] is former chief of staff of an unidentified division who was later transferred and became regimental commander of a certain unit stationed on an island. (8 Feb 81 p 1)

Zhou Fuchen [0719 4395 5256] is identified as chief of staff of an unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (27 Sep 79 p 1)

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PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS

[The following PLA unit number and information are taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

Unit 00010--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 00441--This unit is identified. (12 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 00821--The 2d Zhongdui of this unit is identified. (25 Sep 79 p 2)

Unit 32360--This unit is identified. (3 Mar 81 p 4)

Unit 32385--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)

Unit 32387--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 32406--The logistics department of this unit is mentioned. (3 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 32436--The deputy party branch secretary of the unit's 3d artillery company was cited for providing a good example for the men. (11 Mar 81 p 3)

Unit 32612--A member of this unit was cited for excellent results using antiaircraft guns. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

Unit 32853--Yang Yuanbie [2799 0337 0446] is identified as chief of of the logistics department of this unit. (28 Sep 79 p 1)

Unit 33658--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)

Unit 33982--The 3d Battalion of this unit is identified. (12 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 33986--This unit's rear services department issued each company a tool kit for the repair of training equipment and materials. (25 Feb 81 p 1)

Unit 37399--A member of this unit wrote a short letter to the editor decrying unnecessary expenditures by some units. (26 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 51004--This unit is identified. (30 Jan 81 p 2)

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Unit 51031--A "Heroic Battalion" of this unit is mentioned. (17 Jul 79 p 2)

Unit 51061--This unit is identified. (10 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 51128--Eleven members of this unit who had come on 23 November of this year received expert marksman certificates. (31 Dec 80 p 1)

Unit 53026--Su Xiaodong [5685 2556 2639] is commander of the 4th Company of this unit. (31 Dec 80 p 4)

Unit 53203--The 5th Company of an unidentified regiment of this unit is mentioned. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

Unit 53206--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)

Unit 53212--A new soldier from Wuhan Municipality recently joined this unit. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53213--The 2d Company of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53500--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 1)

Unit 53504--The 1st Company of this unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53509--The 5th Company of this unit is stationed in Tielongshan [Mountains]. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53510--Hu Xingzhou [5170 5281 6650] is a political instructor of the 7th Company of this unit. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

--The 63d Detachment of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53511--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53514--The 82d Detachment of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 53516--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)

Unit 53611--On 27 November 1980, the Hainan MD military court held an open trial at this unit and sentenced Wu Jingui to an 1 1/2-year prison term for stealing weapons and ammunition. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

Unit 53714--This unit is identified. (1 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 54014--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)

Unit 54022--This unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 4)

Unit 54103--This unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

Unit 54104--Cadres and fighters of the 9th Company of this unit planted castor-oil plants in empty places around their area. (11 Mar 81 p 1)

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Unit 54202--The new recruit 3d Company of this unit is identified. (31 Dec 80 p 4)

--A machine gun and artillery company of this unit is mentioned.  
(31 Dec 80 p 3)

Unit 54261--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 54300--This unit is identified. (10 Mar 81 p 4)

Unit 54316--The 1st Company of this unit is identified. (28 Dec 80 p 2)

Unit 54831--Chen Shilian [7115 1102 5114] is identified as platoon leader of an unidentified unit of this unit. (17 Jul 79 p 2)

Unit 55236--The 5th Company of this unit is identified. (31 Jan 81 p 1)

Unit 56014--A member of this unit wrote to the editor complaining of too many meetings. (26 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 56018--Chen Guohai [7115 0948 3189] is identified as deputy company commander of this unit. (3 Mar 81 p 4)

Unit 56033--The 3d artillery company of this unit organized a newspaper clipping service for its members to keep up with current events. (26 Feb 81 p 1)

Unit 56041--Xu Linqun [1776 2651 3123], commander of the 1st Company of this unit, and Li Guozuo [2621 0948 0146], political instructor of the same company, both took part in last year's educational training evaluation held by the Chengdu Units. (12 Mar 81 p 1)

Unit 56110--A motor vehicle company of this unit is mentioned. (25 Sep 79 p 2)

--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 59165--A member of this unit wrote to complain that when eight cross-country vehicles from his unit were being test-driven through the cold region of the northeast, each vehicle was charged a parking fee of 7.50 yuan at a stop-over at the 1st Hostel of the Shenyang Units in Shenyang Municipality. (12 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 81032--A technical innovations team of the engineering corps of this unit and the Heilongjiang University worked closely together to successfully develop an electronic contact fuse which works effectively as an antitank detonator. (10 Jul 79 p 2)

Unit 81054--The party committee of this unit has conscientiously implemented the Military Commission's directive to place emphasis on sending commanding officers to academies and schools for training and improvement. (25 Sep 79 p 1)

Unit 81215--The 9th Company of this unit is identified. (10 Jul 79 p 2)

Unit 81244--The signal battalion of this unit was cited for its good ideological work. (26 Feb 81 p 1)

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Unit 81257--Song Guangshun [1345 1684 7311] is identified as commander of the 2d Battalion of this unit. (25 Sep 79 p 2)

Unit 81425--Members of this unit, which is stationed near Mt Yuanbao, rescued three students who had been ice-skating and were blown to sea on drifting ice. Shenyang Units Armored Forces Deputy Commander Lu [0712], who had been inspecting the unit, was also present during the rescue. (27 Feb 81 p 1)

Unit 81628--A letter to the editor called for efficient filing work after the records of a retiring member of this unit were lost. (26 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 81779--The 1st Battalion of this unit is mentioned. (1 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 81851--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)

Unit 81922--This unit has done a good job in carrying out work on planned births. (25 Sep 79 p 1)

Unit 83016--This unit is identified. (10 Mar 81 p 4)

Unit 83109--The 3d Machine Gun Company of this unit made more than 1,400 yuan by raising mushrooms during spare time. (31 Dec 80 p 1)

Unit 83231--Wu Zongfu [0702 1350 1381] is identified as commander of the 3d Machine Gun Company of this unit. (1 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 83235--A signal battalion of this unit is mentioned. (17 Jul 79 p 2)

Unit 83369--A technician of the ordnance repair shop of this unit successfully trial-produced a set of maintenance tools for 85mm artillery. (24 Sep 79 p 3)

Unit 83402--The 8th Company of this unit is identified. (25 Sep 79 p 2)

Unit 83475--A letter to the editor criticized members of this unit for appropriating things for their own use. (26 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 84835--This unit is identified. (28 Sep 79 p 3)

Unit 86315--This unit is identified. (2 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 88711--The 3d Company of this unit is stationed in a mountain area where cypress trees grow. (28 Sep 79 p 1)

Unit 89336--The movie projection team of this unit received a collective meritorious award, class 3, 2 years in a row for its good work in showing films. The unit is scattered along almost 200 kilometers of railroad doing repairs in a desolate area. (25 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 89951--The first unit in the armed forces to successfully trial-manufacture a wind-powered electric generating device. (31 Dec 80 p 1)

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Hospital 161--Under the Wuhan Units, this hospital began holding spare-time classes in public health. (11 Mar 81 p 1)

Vessel 102--Part of the North China Sea Fleet, the members of this vessel adopted a number of measures to strengthen ideological work. (26 Feb 81 p 1)

Vessel 6337--The party branch of this vessel was cited for looking after the education of its members. (31 Dec 80 p 3)

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## MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

## BRIEFS

POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL WORK--As of 23 February, over 140 leading air force cadres at army and higher levels have visited grassroots units and have played an exemplary role in implementing the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference. While urging leading cadres at the army and higher levels to study the documents well and to achieve unity in thinking, the party committee and leading organs of the air force have called on leading cadres at all other levels to change their workstyle by visiting lower level units and helping them to interpret documents, solve problems, and thoroughly implement the guidelines of the Central Committee Work Conference. Thus far, five standing committee members of the air force party committees have visited frontline units, aviation plants, antiaircraft artillery batteries, and warehouses, where they have given lectures on the documents and have examined and studied the new situation and new problems resulting from the consolidation of units. While on an education tour of one selected unit--the Dingjian squadron of a certain aviation division--political commissar Zhao of a certain army-level air force unit clearly explained to comrades there the vital significance of the consolidation, reminding them that "the rise or fall of a nation is the responsibility of its citizens." Cadres and fighters were deeply moved by this speech. While explaining documents to a certain aviation division, director Jiao of the political department of a certain PLA air force unit invited political cadres at division, regiment, flight wing, and squadron levels to a forum aimed at strengthening their sense of honor and responsibility for carrying out political and ideological work in the course of consolidating PLA air force units. On that basis, he joined this division's political cadres at all levels in studying and working out key measures for strengthening current political and ideological work. In this way, the groundwork has been laid for political cadres to carry out their work in the future. A slash in the military budget has led to a cut in the availability of aviation gasoline. This being the case, how can we maintain and improve the combat capability of our air force units? This is a new problem our air force units now face in the course of their consolidation. While on a tour of lower level units, leading cadres not only stressed the need to carry out military training in a frugal way but also sincerely joined comrades there in pooling their wisdom and in studying and coming up with some good methods and good measures for sharpening training skills, both on the ground and in the air. While on an investigation and study tour of a certain aviation division, commander Yang of the PLA air force unit in Fuzhou proposed four measures for saving aviation gasoline and carrying out training. This division has organized a flight training program in accordance with his proposal, and has accomplished training missions according to a specific timetable and schedule. /Text/ /Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 17 9574

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EAST SEA FLEET TRAINING--After successfully completing the training of the first group of warships, the naval training center of the East China Sea Fleet ceremoniously began training the second group of warships on 15 February. Before the training began, this training center adopted a series of positive measures that take into account the special features of training and new situation and new problems that may arise this year, thus creating the condition for starting the training as scheduled. First, in order to overcome difficulties in drafting a training program for this group of warships, which vary in types and requirements, the center sent leading members in charge of training, operations officers, and instructors on a tour of these warships long before the training took place. While on board these warships, they carefully studied the technical, military, and political qualities of their crew members as well as their demands and suggestions, and used these as the basis for drafting a training program and working out a training schedule. Second, in the face of a slash in the training budget, the center mobilized its personnel to design and produce scores of items of teaching equipment, to compile teaching materials in 48 categories, and to produce 25 graphic charts on war games. In this way, it has cut down education expenditures on behalf of the state and has solved an urgent need for teaching materials. Third, in response to a great demand for streamlining the teaching staff and improving the quality of teaching, the center has reorganized its faculty members. As a result, six unsuitable instructors have been replaced by 14 more experienced and more competent specialists in the operation of warships; they were selected and transferred from various PLA units with the help of higher authorities. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Feb 81 p 17 9574]

REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALION--Following the training started at the foot of the Taihang Mountains by a "combined arms battalion" trial-established by a certain army, a "reinforced infantry battalion" set up by a certain army of the Chengdu Units officially launched its training at the Tailiang Mountains on 17 September. The commanders and fighters said, Training together this way for one day is better than training separately for one month. In order to get experience in coordinated training, this army decided to pick out four artillery companies, one signal platoon, one corps of engineer platoon, one antichemical warfare squad and one medical squad from the 2d Infantry Battalion of a crack army group of a certain unit to form a "reinforced infantry battalion" to carry out a scheduled two and one-half months of training. They also applied to the upper level for tanks and aircraft for combined arms training, and formed a combined arms command unit which consisted of various personnel from infantry, artillery, tank and air force units to direct carrying out the combined arms training. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 21 Sep 79 p 1]

TORPEDO BOATS IN MINE-LAYING--On 11 September, the South China Sea Fleet organized torpedo boats to test the launching of mines. The tests were successful, thus providing the experience of laying mines at sea during wartime. Using fast boats to lay mines is an important combat means to seal off sea lanes during wartime. In the past, each boat used in mine laying operations could carry only two mines which were rolled into the water from a rack on the rear deck. Is it possible to load mines in the boats' torpedo tubes? In order to get first-hand experience, the South China Sea Fleet organized a certain unit to begin conducting tests on 27 August. With the boats drifting and moving, they successfully laid the mines from the torpedo tubes four times in succession. In this way, the capability of using fast boats for mine-laying operations doubled. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 21 Sep 79 p 1]

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